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ABSTRACT 
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was enacted by Congress to prevent criminals 
from hiding or laundering their illicit gains through the U.S. banking system. Over the 
years, criminals continue to exploit the financial system by moving illegal money using 
new technology. Lawmakers should amend the age-old BSA to address monetary 
thresholds of currency transaction reports and suspicious activity reports, along with 
addressing emerging financial technology (Fintech). In dealing with these issues, a 
delicate balance exists between increasing regulation to prevent crime and hindering the 
growth of innovation and customer convenience, along with privacy concerns. This thesis 
provides policy analysis and proposals for legislative and technological improvements to 
financial fraud detection. Furthermore, policy leaders will have a comprehensive 
understanding of the benefits and consequences of specific policy actions. This 
thesis concludes with policy recommendations of the BSA to include increasing the 
currency transaction report from $10,000 to $60,000 along with incorporating the 
controversial beneficial ownership provision. Last, add a minimum standard for a 
client opening financial accounts, increase know-your-customer requirements, and 
regulate peer-to-peer devices. As criminal organizations continue to move money 
throughout the U.S. financial services sector, legislators should amend the BSA to 
address these areas of concern to ensure financial stability and integrity. 
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The Banks Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 was enacted by Congress to prevent 
criminals from hiding or laundering their illicit gains through the U.S. banking system.1 
The statute’s objective forced financial institutions to maintain currency transactions 
reports, along with identifying individuals conducting suspicious transactions.2 
Preserving these records allow law enforcement the ability to pursue and arrest criminals 
involved in money laundering or other financial crimes. Since the inception of the BSA, 
legislators have provided minimal updates, and the monetary thresholds of the currency 
transaction reports (CTRs) and suspicious activity reports (SARs) need to be addressed. 
Furthermore, with the innovations in financial technology (fintech), criminals 
continue to exploit these new technologies to move money and obfuscate law 
enforcement. Currently, the BSA does not adequately address emerging technologies like 
machine learning, digital currency, know your customer, and peer-to-peer technology. As 
criminals continue to move money throughout the financial system, lawmakers should 
amend the BSA to address emerging fintech while addressing the monetary thresholds of 
cash transactions and suspicious activity. 
In dealing with these issues, a delicate balance exists between increasing 
regulation to prevent crime and hindering the growth of innovation and customer 
convenience, along with privacy concerns. This thesis provides a policy analysis and 
proposal for legislative and technological improvements to financial fraud detection. 
Furthermore, policy leaders will have a comprehensive understanding of the benefits and 
consequences of specific policy action.3  
                                                 
1 “FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, accessed February 4, 
2019, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/fincens-mandate-congress. 
2 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual (Washington, DC: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2014), 3, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/bsa_aml_man_2014.pdf. 
3 Samantha Holquist, “How to Conduct an Effective Policy Analysis,” GovLoop (blog), July 18, 2013, 
https://www.govloop.com/community/blog/how-to-conduct-an-effective-policy-analysis/. 
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This paper discusses in detail the proposed monetary changes to the BSA as 
introduced in the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act. The Counter Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Act would have altered the BSA to address the monetary CTR and SAR 
thresholds.4 The question surrounding these monetary requirements are: Should the 
current thresholds remain the same? Or should the amounts be adjusted as stated in the 
counter-terrorism act? Or should the monetary amounts be adjusted to account for 
inflation? Also, the counter-terrorism act removed the highly contested beneficiary 
ownership provision. Addressing these various issues becomes complicated, especially 
when considering the stakeholders involved. These concerns are addressed using a policy 
options criteria and matrix ranking the threat to public safety, the cost to the banking 
industry, the impact on law enforcement investigations, and political acceptance or 
opposition. Furthermore, several viewpoints with a detailed perspective from bank 
executives, law enforcement, and privacy advocates are discussed to provide a complete 
representation of the affected parties. 
Fraud detection is an ongoing and challenging problem for financial institutions. 
Internal currency alerts only detected 50% of money laundering or terrorist financing.5 
The banking industry also has difficulty hiring experienced staff to detect or comply with 
anti-money laundering (AML) regulations.6 With these two significant issues, machine 
learning (ML) can process large amounts of data to detect fraudulent activity that thus 
assists financial institutions. In the financial sector, “machine learning is trained to 
recognize normal transactions within the data and then identify all deviations and 
anomalies in real-time.”7 Using this relatively new technology, financial institutions can 
detect suspicious activity instead of paying a traditional analyst. However, ML has 
                                                 
4 LegiNation, “US—HR 6068: Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act,” Bill Track 50, accessed 
February 21, 2019, https://www.billtrack50.com/BillDetail/986684. 
5 Trevor White, Mark Anderson, and Didier Lavion, Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime (PwC US, 
2016), 42. 
6 White, Anderson, and Lavion, 42. 
7 Mercator Advisory Group, Inc., Fraud Detection 2.0: Dynamic Tools for Fighting E-Commerce 
Fraud (Boise, ID: Knout, 2017), 5, https://info.kount.com/white-paper/fraud-detection-dynamic-tools-for-
fighting-ecommerce-fraud. 
xv 
disadvantages in regards to accuracy, along with costly implementation and maintenance 
concerns. 
Digital currency has also been a growing concern among regulators. When people 
think of digital currency, Bitcoin comes to everyone’s mind. Bitcoin has the largest 
market financial resources of any decentralized digital currency.8 Even though Bitcoin is 
the most widely circulated digital currency, many other digital currencies are available, 
such as Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, and Monaro, to name a few. The concept of having a 
decentralized payment system is very enticing to several citizens and entities. 
Nevertheless, criminals continue to use digital currency as a means to launder illicit funds 
without detection. Sophisticated criminals even use digital privacy coins, mixers, and 
blenders, to further exasperate law enforcement tracing abilities.  
Know-your-customer (KYC) has become a common term within the banking 
industry. KYC is often referred to as the customer identification programs (CIP) as 
mentioned in the USA PATRIOT Act.9 The customer identification program or the term 
used now as KYC was purposely left vague to allow the banking industry flexibility in 
implementing this requirement.10 The KYC portions of the USA Patriot Act were used to 
verify new customers and not focus on longtime loyal customers.11 With the development 
of new technology, individuals can open bank accounts and transfer money without 
appearing at a local bank. This same technology allows criminals to move illicit money 
throughout the financial system while providing limited identification to banks. 
Appropriate KYC rules governing financial institutions are crucial in maintaining 
financial integrity to identify the source of money.12 The BSA must provide banks with a 
                                                 
8 William Frentzen and Kathryn Haun, United States vs BTC-E and Alexander Vinnik (Washington, 
DC: Department of Justice, 2017), 3, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/press-release/file/984661/down 
load. 
9 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism, Public Law 107–56, 3162 H.R. 272 (2001), 317, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/ 
publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf. 
10 Steve Cocheo, “Flexible Patriot Rules Prove Double-Edged Blade,” ABA Banking Journal 95, no. 12 
(December 2003): 52, ProQuest. 
11 Cocheo, 54. 
12 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual, 3. 
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minimum standard for a client to open an account. These rules should ensure consistency 
among local and national banks, while carefully considering the implications of 
international banking. 
With the development of the fintech industry, access to mobile money and peer-
to-peer (P2P) transfers continue to increase. As more consumers and merchants embrace 
P2P networks solutions, criminals exploit these new platforms to launder illicit funds. 
Many P2P services meet the definition of financial institutions or money transmitters 
under the BSA/AML rules, as defined by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN). The BSA should clearly define P2P services. Many fintech P2P services are 
not maintaining an adequate KYC program, anti-money laundering program, or filing 
appropriate CTRs. The BSA should address P2P transactions by using not only specific 
payment cards but also the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI), international 
mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), and the integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID). 
Regulators must hold P2P payment services more accountable by increased monitoring 
and using fintech to detect the movement of illicit funds by mandating P2P services 
monitor not only payment cards, but also phone devices through IMEI, IMSI, and ICCID 
for fraud detection. 
This thesis discusses the advantages and disadvantages of ML, digital currency, 
KYC, and P2P technologies. An analysis of the technologies will consider cost, ease of 
implementation, sustainability, accuracy, privacy concerns, and public and political 
acceptability. A matrix will be developed objectively ranking each criterion and 
concluding with a detailed discussion on the results. The arguments will focus on bank 
executives, law enforcement, civil libertarian groups followed by a comprehensive 
analysis. 
This document concludes with several recommendations to improve and updated 
the BSA. First, raising the monetary threshold of CTR filing from $10,000 to $60,000, 
the rate of inflation. Furthermore, the BSA should grant the U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
the ability to raise the monetary CTR filing on a five-year basis to adjust for inflation. 
The current monetary thresholds for SARs should remain the same, and the highly 
contested beneficial ownership provision should be added. 
xvii 
Advanced technology, like ML and distributed ledger technology, should not be 
mandated in the BSA but encouraged as the technology develops. Currently, the 
complexity of the technology, the monetary cost to banking institutions, privacy 
concerns, and political oppositions are all reasons for not mandating this type of 
technology in the BSA.  
On the other hand, the BSA should regulate digital currency. FinCEN has already 
mandated several regulations on digital currency exchangers, but these regulations should 
be discussed and addressed by legislators. Advanced digital privacy coins, mixers, and 
tumblers also should be regulated within the BSA.  
This thesis also recommends a minimum standard for a client to open an account. 
As a KYC requirement, fintech can utilize biometrics as an additional provision. Also, 
using a risk-based approach regarding KYC, as suggested by the Financial Crimes Task 
Force.13 These recommendations ensure consistency not only throughout the United 
States but also globally. Finally, P2P payment services should increase monitoring of 
financial transactions as related to IMEI, IMSI, and ICCID.  
Supporters and challengers of the BSA all agree on the need to update the 
historical mandates within the act to address emerging threats and technology. As 
criminal organizations continue to move money throughout the U.S. financial services 
sector, legislators should amend the BSA to address these areas of concern to ensure 
financial stability and integrity. Legislators should also be cautious in restricting 
innovation within the United States, as fintech encourages financial ingenuity and 
security to accelerate financial services globally.  
 
                                                 
13 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, International Standards on Combating Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (Paris, France: Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, 2018), 62–63, www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.html. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 mandates that financial institutions in the 
United States assist U.S. law enforcement (LE) agencies in detecting and preventing the 
movement of illicit money through the nation’s financial system.1  
Based on this law, banks are required to “file reports of cash transactions 
exceeding $10,000 (daily aggregated amount), and to report suspicious activity” 
indicative of potential money laundering.2 Providing and preserving these records allow 
law enforcement the ability to pursue and arrest criminals involved in money laundering 
or other financial crimes. Since the inception of the BSA, legislators have provided 
minimal updates, and the monetary thresholds of the currency transaction reports (CTRs) 
and suspicious activity reports (SARs) need to be addressed. 
The innovations in financial technology (fintech) create another payment method 
for criminals to move money and obfuscate law enforcement. Currently, the BSA does 
not adequately address emerging technologies like machine learning (ML), digital 
currency, know-your-customer (KYC), and peer-to-peer (P2P) technology. In November 
2018, the senior deputy comptroller Grovetta Gardineer, for Compliance and Community 
Affairs testified before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
“It is critical that the nearly 50-year-old BSA/AML [Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money 
Laundering] regime be updated and enhanced to address today’s threats and better utilize 
the capabilities of modern technology in protecting the financial system from illicit 
                                                 
1 “FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, accessed February 4, 
2019, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/fincens-mandate-congress. 
2 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. 
2 
activity.”3 As criminals continue to move money throughout the financial system, 
lawmakers should amend the BSA to address emerging fintech. 
In dealing with the current monetary thresholds and advanced technology, a 
delicate balance exists between increasing regulation to prevent crime and hindering the 
growth of innovation and customer convenience. For example, P2P technology allows for 
the movement of funds among the financial sector, but the reporting requirements are 
ambiguous as to the movement of cash.4 Also, with the opening of accounts online, 
customer identification is an increasing concern; “know your customer” is a common 
motto within the banking industry, but with the development of new technologies, 
different techniques can identify customers whether through biometrics or the use of 
international mobile equipment identity numbers. The BSA does not explicitly address 
these types of technological advances to address money-laundering detection.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the BSA be reformed to address the monetary thresholds and emerging 
technology to prevent money laundering and illicit financing?  
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Overview of the Bank Secrecy Act 
Money laundering has been an ongoing problem for years and continues to pose a 
threat to international economies regardless of the BSA regulations. Global money 
laundering transaction is estimated to be around $1–2 trillion annually.5 This amount is 
                                                 
3 Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: Regulator and Law Enforcement 
Perspectives on Reform: Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, 
115th Cong., 2nd sess., November 29, 2018, 13, https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/10/24/2018/ 
combating-money-laundering-and-other-forms-of-illicit-finance-regulator-and-law-enforcement-perspec 
tives-on-reform. 
4 Benjamin Lo, “Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments 
Innovation,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 18, no. 1 (2017): 126, https://digitalcommons.law.yale. 
edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/4/. 
5 Trevor White, Mark Anderson, and Didier Lavion, Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime (PwC US, 
2016), 41. 
3 
equal to 2 to 5% of the global GDP (gross domestic product).6 According to a 2011 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, law enforcement authorities seize less than 
1% of global illicit funds.7 Over the years, Congress has adjusted the BSA to combat the 
movement of unlawful money.  
Congress enacted the Banks Secrecy Act of 1970 to prevent criminals from hiding 
or laundering their illicit gains through the U.S. banking system. The statute’s objective 
forced financial institutions to maintain currency transactions reports, along with 
identifying individuals conducting these illegal transactions.8 With the preservation of 
these financial statements, law enforcement agencies can detect and arrest criminals 
involved in financial offenses against the state. 
The Money Laundering Control Act augmented the BSA and made money 
laundering a federal crime. In 1986, Congress criminalized money laundering by passing 
two significant sections, Title 18 U.S.C. 1956 (Money Laundering Crime) and Title 18 
U.S.C. 1957 (Monetary Transactions Crime).9 Money laundering crime specifies the 
criminal activity to disguise or conceal the movement of money used for drug trafficking, 
organized misconduct, or other financial crimes. Monetary transactions crime is anyone 
who “knowingly engages” or “attempts to engage” in an illegal monetary transaction.10 
These two laws enforce U.S. efforts to pursue money launders aggressively.  
The BSA received further regulation from the Money Laundering Suppression 
Act of 1994. This act provided guidance and also empowered banking regulators to stop 
money laundering in two significant ways.11 First, regulators’ training from law 
enforcement regarding recent trends used by criminals and examination procedures to 
                                                 
6 White, Anderson, and Lavion, 41. 
7 White, Anderson, and Lavion, 41. 
8 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual, 3. 
9 Charles Plombeck, The International Lawyer (Cary, NC: American Bar Association, 1988), 2–8. 
10 Plombeck, 8. 
11 Cory Howard, “Financial Crimes Compliance Self-Governance: Applying the Faragher Defense to 
Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Violations,” The University of Memphis Law Review 48, no. 1 
(2017): 57, https://www.memphis.edu/law/documents/howard_financialcrimescomplianceself-governance. 
pdf. 
4 
detect money laundering schemes was enhanced.12 Second, the Secretary of Treasury 
authorized regulators the ability to impose civil money penalties on financial 
institutions.13 This act streamlined the civil penalty cases by removing the older 
cumbersome process.14 With this provision, depository institutions received training and 
were held accountable by the risk of civil money penalties. 
Federal regulators released the long-awaited new SAR in 1996. The new SAR 
requirements replaced the criminal referral forms and restructured the reporting 
requirements using computer software.15 With the new requirement, financial institutions 
only file with Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) instead of multiple law 
enforcement agencies and the monetary reporting threshold increased.16 These new 
regulations reduced the administrative burdens on the banking industry. 
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 also enhanced the BSA’s customer 
identification program. Section 311 of the Act allows the Secretary of Treasury to enact 
“special measures” against any foreign county or foreign institution involved in money 
laundering.17 These special measures include reporting certain transactions, record 
keeping, collection of beneficial ownership, payable account information, and gathering 
correspondent accounts.18 Under section 326 of the Act, the Secretary of Treasury sets 
forth a standard for customers opening bank accounts at financial institutions.19 At a 
minimum, banking institutions must verify the identity of any account holder, maintain 
                                                 
12 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Bank Secrecy Act: Opportunities Exist for FinCEN and the 
Banking Regulators to Further Strengthen the Framework for Consistent BSA Oversight, GAO-06-386 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006), 24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/ 
157691.pdf. 
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 24. 
14 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 24. 
15 Anonymous, “New Suspicious Activity Report Streamlines Reporting System,” ABA Bank Security 
& Fraud Prevention; 3, no. 1 (January 1996): 1, ProQuest. 
16 Anonymous, 1. 
17 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H. Res. 3162, 107th Cong., 1st. sess., 21, https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162/text/enr. 
18 USA PATRIOT ACT, 28–32. 
19 USA PATRIOT ACT, 46. 
5 
accurate records, and consult a list of suspected terrorists.20 The USA PATRIOT Act 
strengthened the BSA by enforcing these additional provisions.  
Based on these alterations to the BSA, the U.S. government is holding banks 
accountable for not having an effective anti-money laundering procedure in place. In 
2012, HSBC Group “agreed to forfeit $1.256 billion as part of its deferred prosecution 
agreement” and “pay $665 million in civil penalties” for violating the BSA.21 According 
to the Department of Justice, $881 million in drug proceeds were laundered through 
HSBC’s financial system.22 In 2017, the Deutsche Bank was also fined $41 million by 
the U.S. Federal Reserve for not having an adequate anti-money laundering program.23 
They were provided with guidelines and deadlines to bring their internal systems into 
compliance.24 Regulators continue to use the BSA to hold financial institutions 
accountable.  
2. Financial Fraud Trends Involving New Technology 
Throughout history, the American currency system continues to evolve from 
paper currency to payment cards to wire transfers and now to digital currency in the form 
of bits and bytes. Fintech describes the recent transformation taking place throughout the 
global financial services sectors.25 The use of contactless payments, digital wallets, and 
apps are the norm for purchasing or transferring funds.26 Users and financial institutions 
are adopting fintech solutions as a new way to conduct money transfers and payments. 
                                                 
20 USA PATRIOT ACT, 46. 
21 United States Attorney’s Office, “HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-
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Department of Justice, December 11, 2012, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-
bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations. 
22 United States Attorney’s Office. 
23 Ann Misback, United States of America before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System Washington, D.C. (Washington, DC: The Federal Reserve Board, 2017), 13, https://www.fed 
eralreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20170530a.htm. 
24 Misback, 5–14. 
25 Michael Lamer, The Future of Fintech ~ The New Standard (United Kingdom: Juniper Research, 
2019), 1, https://www.juniperresearch.com/document-library/white-papers/the-future-of-fintech-the-new-
standard-white-paper. 
26 Lamer, 2. 
6 
Money launders continue to increase in sophistication and complexity with the 
use of fintech-like digital currency. This new currency has become a game changer 
regarding the movement of illicit money because anonymous transactions are allowed. In 
using this new form of currency, criminals can avoid using the U.S. financial system and 
transfer money without accessing a centralized government authority that draws serious 
scrutiny from regulators.27 Digital currencies have become the money of choice to move 
funds anonymously and avoid law enforcement detection.  
PayPal is an example of one fintech that operates a worldwide P2P online money 
transfer platform. Simser describes PayPal as “an online intermediary that processes 
payments between users over the internet.”28 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
determined that PayPal was not a banking institution.29 Later though in 2009, FinCEN 
considered PayPal a money transmitter from the anti-money laundering perspective.30 
According to Juniper Research, mobile wallet users will increase from the currently 2.3 
billion users to 4 billion users by 2024. Also, fintech platform revenues are expected to 
reach $638 billion by 2024.31 These numbers reveal an explosive growth in online 
payment services and fintech platforms like PayPal and other web-based apps. 
As announced in June 2019, Facebook is expected to launch a new 
cryptocurrency called Libra in 2020.32 With this new technology, users can transfer 
money, pay bills, or send digital currency using a digital wallet available in messenger, or 
as a separate app.33 Facebook states:  
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For many people around the world, even basic financial services are 
still out of reach: almost half of the adults in the world don’t have an 
active bank account, and those numbers are worse in developing 
countries and even worse for women. The cost of that exclusion is high 
— approximately 70% of small businesses in developing countries lack 
access to credit and $25 billion is lost by migrants every year through 
remittance fees.34  
This new cryptocurrency is one example of fintech changing the global financial payment 
systems, but it also allows another method for criminals to move money globally.  
As the cost of regulatory compliance continues to increase, bankers need to 
update their legacy monitoring systems with innovative technology regularly. Combating 
the financing of terrorism and detecting money launderers continue to be an expensive 
and challenging endeavor even for well-established and sophisticated financial 
institutions.35 Banking executives should embrace fintech solutions, and regulators need 
to monitor this new technology closely to prevent money laundering while allowing 
continued innovation. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a policy analysis and proposal, conducted according to the eight 
steps recommended by Eugene Bardach, for legislative and technological improvements 
to financial fraud detection. Bardach’s policy analysis ensures an accurate and efficient 
assessment of the potential outcome.36 Furthermore, policy leaders will have a 
comprehensive understanding of the benefits and consequences of specific policy 
action.37  
First, the background of the BSA and a proposed Congressional Bill called the 
Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act is discussed in detail. On June 12, 2018, 
Representative Stevan Pearce introduced the bill in the House of Representatives, but it 
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never appeared for a vote.38 The Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act would alter 
the BSA to address the SAR and CTR requirements and advanced technology.  It is 
currently unknown whether the bill will be reintroduced in 2019, but this bill and the 
BSA based on the criteria of risk to public safety, costs to banks, impact on law 
enforcement and political opposition are evaluated with recommendations made. The 
examination of the BSA is limited to elements that pertain to money laundering detection 
by financial institutions. 
The second part of this proposed thesis is an evaluation of several emerging 
financial technologies that might help detect, prevent, or investigate money laundering, 
with an emphasis on CTR and SAR requirements. Specifically, the focus is on machine 
learning, digital currency, KYC technology, and P2P transfers. 
The analysis of the technologies consider complexity, costs to banks, privacy 
concerns, and political opposition. Each category is given a specific criterion to 
distinguish a low, medium, or high rating. Each category is given a specific criterion to 
distinguish a low, medium, or high rating. A matrix objectively ranks each criterion and 
concludes with a detailed discussion on the results. For example, financial institutions 
favor any policy recommendation that alleviates workforce stressors and expense, and 
that reduces reporting requirements. On the other hand, law enforcement and FinCEN 
favor policy recommendations that increase reporting requirements for specific insight 
into the movement of illicit money. Civil libertarian groups are concerned with privacy 
and the sharing of personal information between banks and law enforcement. 
For each criterion, data and evidence obtained from financial institutions, private 
sector companies, congressional briefings, and comparing often-contradictory sources of 
academic research are used. Based on these guidelines, this thesis makes 
recommendations based on current gaps within the BSA.  
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E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis explores gaps within the BSA with a specific emphasis on current 
monetary thresholds and financial technology. Chapter I defines the problem space along 
with the primary research question. Also, this chapter presents a historical overview of 
the BSA and recent financial fraud trends involving new technology to obfuscate law 
enforcement.  
The second chapter provides a literature review on the Counter Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Act and fintech. This chapter also addresses the current arguments 
regarding the current monetary thresholds and fintech to monitor and regulate the 
movement of illicit funds.  
Chapter III addresses the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, which 
amends the BSA. This thesis describes the objective of this act with the advantages and 
limitations of making this act a law. The thesis describes various policy options and 
provides a detailed analysis using a policy options matrix. 
In Chapter IV, the thesis provides an overview of recent financial technologies, 
specifically, machine learning, digital currency, KYC, and P2P. This chapter analyzes 
each fintech for possible impacts on the BSA and each option is rated in a matrix. 
The fifth chapter provides a series of recommendation for policymakers regarding 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on reforming the BSA yields four broad categories: the historical 
debate, regulatory issues, a proposed congressional bill called the Counter Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Act, and the use of advanced fintech to monitor money-laundering 
activities.  
A. HISTORICAL DEBATE 
Since the law was enacted in 1970, the BSA has been highly contested by 
regulators who demand that banks maintain financial records along with specific 
reporting requirements to prevent money laundering versus the violations of privacy as 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment by civil liberty advocates.39 A three-judge 
federal panel even ruled parts of the BSA unconstitutional two years after the BSA 
became law in a 2:1 decision in Stark v. Connally.40 Following the ruling, James Dobey, 
the current executive vice president of Wells Fargo, stated, “Our position, since the 
regulations were first spelled out by the Treasury Department, were [sic] that they were 
too all-inclusive and had gone beyond what was necessary to stop the illegal flow of 
funds overseas. We are pleased that the court agrees.”41 Judge Hamilin was the lone 
dissenting opinion who stated the courts should be “slow in finding a congressional 
enactment unconstitutional.”42 The court upheld portions of the BSA that deal with 
foreign recordkeeping and reporting requirements.43 The American Civil Liberties Union 
and the California Bankers Association also challenged the act’s constitutionality.44 
Business owners find confidentiality and secrecy attractive in dealing with trade and 
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commerce.45 Following the three-judge panel, the U.S. Supreme Court under Justice 
Rehnquist, reversed the lower court’s ruling and upheld the BSA as constitutionally 
valid.46 
When it comes to this topic, the Treasury Department argues that the BSA is 
necessary for reducing the movement of illicit money and will benefit the general 
public.47 The provisions of the BSA require banks to report “large currency transactions,” 
which assists in the detection of money laundering, tax evasion, and securities fraud.48 
Historically, it has been challenging to prosecute tax and securities violations without 
information regarding secret offshore bank accounts.49 Likewise, the Security and 
Exchange Commission has expressed concern over the integrity of the financial system 
given the increased safe havens for criminal activity.50  
B. REGULATORY ISSUES 
The regulatory requirements within the BSA need to consider the costly burden 
placed on financial institutions while not allowing criminals to exploit the Federal 
Reserve System. On November 29, 2018, the senior deputy comptroller for compliance 
and community affairs, Grovetta Gardineer, testified before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, about updating the age-old BSA and using fintech 
to protect the U.S. financial sector.51 The testimony discusses the reform and 
modernization needed for AML regulations without compromising law enforcement 
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efforts.52 Jodi Avergun and Colleen Kukowski, a former U.S. Attorney and FBI 
employee, agree with Gardineer’s concerns over AML regulations.53  
Furthermore, Paul Treleaven, a professor of the Financial Computer Center in 
London advises that effective financial regulations are crucial in the fintech industry.54 
The author writes on behalf of EY, a global company and leader in financial transaction 
and advisory services.55 The author describes current regulatory pressures and the need 
for regulatory reform without hindering the growth of new businesses.56 He explains that 
a relationship must exist between the regulators and the regulated for a cohesive 
solution.57  
Along the same line, Benjamin Lo published an article in the Yale Journal of Law 
and Technology describing the regulatory burden on payment startup companies.58 The 
articles explains that fintech companies must deal with fragmented regulations among the 
various states along with federal regulation.59 Lo contends that financial regulation 
should be harmonized across states to allow for more opportunities for innovation.60 
Agreeing with Lo, Paul Treleavan mentions regulators, financial institutions, and fintech 
companies must work together to improve financial regulations.61 Both Lo and 
Treleavan, along with the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, deputy comptroller, 
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and congressmen, encourage innovation and competition without hindering growth from 
excessive oversight and financial regulation.62  
Lo also describes an interesting debate around broad money transmitter laws.63 In 
which, regulators contend that institutions moving large amounts of money should be 
regulated for consumer protection and money laundering prevention.64 On the other hand, 
fintech companies criticize these heavy regulatory requirements that stifle innovation and 
growth.65  
C. COUNTER TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCE ACT 
The Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, if enacted into law under the 
original draft, would have been “the most substantial overhaul to the Bank Secrecy Act 
(‘BSA’) since the PATRIOT Act.”66 In June 2018, Representative Stevan Pearce and 
Blaine Luetkemeyer introduced the highly contested Counter Terrorism and Illicit 
Finance Act, formally known as H.R. 6068.67 This act would increase the dollar amount 
for SAR and CTR requirements and allow for the sharing of suspicious activities among 
financial groups.68 The bill also requests that the Secretary of Treasury along with federal 
law enforcement agencies review current reporting requirements under the BSA to reduce 
the current regulatory burdens on financial institutions.69 
                                                 
62 Julien Courbe, Financial Services Technology 2020 and Beyond: Embracing Disruption (New York: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016), 9, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/financial-services/assets/pdf/technology20 
20-and-beyond.pdf. 
63 Lo, “Fatal Fragments,” 113. 
64 Lo, 113. 
65 Lo, 113. 
66 Brad Gershel, “Beneficial Ownership Provision Stripped from Latest Draft of Counter Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Act,” National Law Review, June 20, 2018, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/benefici 
al-ownership-provision-stripped-latest-draft-counter-terrorism-and-illicit. 
67 Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, H.R. 6068, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., June 12, 2018, 1, 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr6068/BILLS-115hr6068ih.pdf. 
68 Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, 1. 
69 Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, 3. 
15 
Before the bill was introduced, the original draft was stripped of the beneficial 
ownership provision.70 This provision mandates that shell companies or front companies 
reveal their true beneficial owner, which has caused great debate.71  
The National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions (NAFCU) along 
with 11 other financial industry trades supported the beneficial ownership provision.72 
The associations stated in a joint letter to the finance committee:  
It is our hope that this will help reduce the anticipated burden of 
complying with the requirements of the CDD rule. Financial institutions 
should be able to rely on the information reported by businesses to 
FinCEN, which would, in turn, reduce the reporting burden on those 
businesses.73  
Along with encouraging the provision, the association supports the use of machine 
learning and new technology for detecting suspicious activity.74  
Along the same line, the Delaware Secretary of State sent a letter to the Financial 
Services Committee Chairman and ranking members endorsing the beneficial ownership 
provision.75 The letter encourages a nationwide framework of collecting beneficial 
ownership information for combating money laundering and financing of terrorism rather 
than an unsystematic partial state-based approach with loopholes.76 The provision also 
provides law enforcement with tools needed to combat financial crimes successfully.77  
Law enforcement, specifically the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which is the 
world’s largest sworn law enforcement organization, supports the beneficial ownership 
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provision. For years, the FOP has supported legislations to reveal the true beneficial 
ownership information to combat criminal activity.78 The FOP further believes the 
beneficial ownership information of the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act is the 
most critical provision, and without this legislation, law enforcement will not have the 
adequate tools to pursue criminal activity.79 Federal law enforcement agencies have 
discontinued criminal investigations based on the difficulty in determining true beneficial 
ownership.80 
On the other hand, FreedomWorks, an association that supports individual 
liberties and free markets, strongly opposes the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance 
Act. FreedomWorks states the Act along with the ownership provision “detonates due 
process and the right to privacy.”81 FreedomWorks believes the Act encourages 
businesses to spy on banking customers and destroys another level of individual 
privacy.82 According to Jason Pye, a vice president for FreedomWorks, “The government 
would gain warrantless access to even more sensitive financial records protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.”83  
Congressman Luetkemeyer and Pearce argue the Counter Terrorism and Illicit 
Finance Act will assist in protecting and safeguarding the U.S. financial system.84 
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Furthermore, the bill will assist in updating anti-money laundering and counterterrorism 
standards throughout the financial industry.85 
D. FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
Several key industry leaders have mentioned the need for advanced technology in 
financial services. One of these leaders is PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which assists 
businesses with digital transformation leveraging fintech so that companies can maintain 
efficient and agile operations.86 Julien Courbe, the Global Financial Service Technology 
Leader for PwC, describes that executives must understand technology to compete in 
financial services.87 Agreeing with this statement, Paul Treleavan, the author of Financial 
Regulation of FinTech, recommends financial services need to improve through 
automation and analytic standards, and reduce systemic risk.88  
Providing statistics and graphs describing the increase in fintech, KPMG operates 
globally in over 150 countries and territories that publishes a bi-annual report on recent 
trends in the fintech industry.89 KPMG also derives data from a company called 
PitchBook.90 PitchBook tracks datasets and features across public and private markets, 
venture capital, private equity, and mergers and acquisitions.91 With this combined data, 
the article describes the global rise of fintech and the way technology is transforming the 
financial services industry. Several other scholars confirm the rise of fintech.  
1. Machine Learning for Fraud Detection 
One obligation under the BSA is monitoring for suspicious activity. Failure to 
comply can be extremely costly. In February 2018, U.S. Bancorp agreed to pay a fine of 
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$528 million for violating the BSA.92 ML is a recent fintech that can assist with 
monitoring for illicit activity. The comptroller, Grovetta Gardineer, testified before 
Congress that banks should use new technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and 
ML, for increased monitoring of suspicious activity as a way to manage costs.93 PwC, a 
leader in digital transformation, also agrees with this assessment.94 
In 2018, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) researchers attempted to 
reduce the number of false-positive transactions plaguing the financial sector by using 
transactional and historical data to increase the probability of fraud detection.95 The 
researchers extracted over 200 separate features from historical payment information to 
obtain a profile of an individual’s spending habits.96 Using these features, the data 
scientists tested millions of transactions from an international bank using ML 
technology.97 The results of the study revealed that using historical behavior data and 
transaction data achieved better results than ML solutions that rely merely on 
transactional features.98 Based on the recency of the study and the transparency of the 
algorithm, no one has yet disputed their findings. This study does build on current private 
sector ML solutions that use transactional data and behavior analytics for fraud detection. 
The leading private sector companies operating in this space are Guardian Analytics, 
Stripe Radar; FICO Flacon Platform, Feedzai, and Kount Inc., to list a few. These 
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companies agree that using ML and behavioral analytics assists with money laundering 
detection; several hundred banks use this fintech platform.99  
Scholars and executive managers agree on the limitations of using this fintech. 
One of the main issues with ML is its “black box decision-making.”100 Scholars define 
black box decision-making as an “opaque decision system,” like ML.101 In a real-world 
application, First Data Corporation states that government policies require an explanation 
of why a machine or algorithm made a decision.102 This information is difficult to 
ascertain and pass along to customers or upper-level executives without a proper 
explanation. In dealing with these concerns, Bank of America even created a council in 
2017 with Harvard and MIT to conduct an academic study on the possible ethical 
consequences of using such technology.103 Bank of America is providing the funding for 
a three-year academic study, which shows the concern business executives have with 
using algorithms to make business decisions.  
Several scholars share the concerns of using ML and algorithms in the financial 
sector. Campbell-Verduyn, Goguen, and Porter explain these various concerns in an 
academic research article funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada. Their research explains the techno-dystopian perspectives of using 
big data and algorithmic governance.104 Their work addresses the black-box issue of 
using algorithms and how they are layered behind mathematical equations, nondisclosure 
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agreements, and trade secrets. This contrast between the advantages and concerns of ML 
technology is ongoing throughout the financial sector. Should financial institutions be 
required to use this fintech for money laundering detection under the BSA?  
2. Digital Currency 
An ongoing debate is whether digital currency should be regulated under the BSA 
or remain unregulated as suggested by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).105 
Digital currency was designed to exchange money between users without going through a 
centralized banking system like the Federal Reserve System. Chief of the fraud unit, 
Scott Bradford from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Oregon, serves as the 
Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Coordinator.106 Bradford wrote a detailed 
article on recent cybercrime threats with a focus on digital currency. The author states 
that under the BSA, FinCEN requires that digital currency exchanges meet the same 
standards as other money services businesses under Title 31 U.S. Code § 5330.107 The 
Director of FinCEN affirmed this statement in 2018 when stating that digital currency 
exchangers establish an anti-money laundering program and file SARs.108 FinCEN even 
clarified that digital currency exchangers are considered money transmitters, whether 
located domestically or internationally.109  
On a more extreme level, Congressman Brad Sherman urged his fellow 
colleagues to pass legislation banning digital currency in the United States.110 He based 
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this statement on the Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas, using Bitcoin, and Iran using 
cryptocurrencies to circumvent financial sanctions.111 The currency also diminishes the 
power of the Federal Reserve in regulating the economy.112 
Anthony Pompliano strongly opposes the outlawing of digital currency. 
Pompliano, the founder of Morgan Creek Digital Assets and a leading advocate of 
bitcoin, understands Congressman Sherman’s concern about the world moving to non-
sovereign currencies.113 Pompliano conveys that Sherman’s most significant donors are 
from the financial services companies; thus, the Congressman wants to protect his 
donors.114 Pompliano concludes by stating, “Bitcoin is better than fiat currencies.”115 
Eventually, politicians will have to engage with not only crypto companies but financial 
institutions and private companies involved in the digital currency space.  
The EFF, a nonprofit organization that defends civil liberties, user privacy, and 
innovation, agrees with Pompliano’s assessment.116 The EFF further explains that even 
though criminals may use cryptocurrencies for illicit activity, the U.S. government should 
not ban this new form of currency.117 Well-known cryptocurrency transactions, like 
Bitcoin and Ethereum, are recorded on public ledgers for anyone to see. Although, a 
growing number of digital currencies offer more privacy protection and anonymity on the 
public ledger.118 Another benefit, cryptocurrency may eventually assist many individuals 
with a low credit score or people without access to financial services.119  
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3. Know-Your-Customer Rule 
The KYC rule is another significant concern under the BSA, as Iza 
Wojciechowska explains the requirements for financial institutions. The purpose of KYC 
is to restrict the ability of criminals to move money throughout the financial system 
anonymously. Scholars explain that under the USA PATRIOT Act, financial institutions 
must comply with two main requirements, the “Customer Identification Program (CIP) 
and customer due diligence (CDD).”120 Banks conduct their own CIP process, which 
varies among institutions.121 Several pieces of literature support Wojcieshowaska’s 
claim. 
Dr. Norman Mugarura opposes the USA PATRIOT Act and KYC solutions. 
Working for Global Action Research and Development Initiative, he specializes in 
money laundering regulation and compliance.122 Dr. Mugarura argues that KYC 
solutions, along with the USA PATRIOT Act, causes confusion, controversies, and 
tension between bankers and customers.123 Furthermore, the ill-defined regulation is 
counterproductive and allows banks to conduct extensive surveillance on financial 
transactions.124  
Alan Gelb, the author of “Balancing Financial Integrity with Financial Inclusion,” 
mentions another way to KYC. He agrees with Dr. Mugarura by stating KYC is 
becoming an inconvenience with customers, as bank requests additional information that 
thus creates more friction with customers.125 Gelb considers an alternative solution is 
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applying a risk-based approach (RBA) toward KYC.126 Gelb argues that the level of due 
diligence and incentives for KYC should be proportional to the balance of risk.127 
Balancing financial integrity and financial inclusion should be not only a domestic 
priority but a global one as well.128 Striking a balance between banking requirements and 
customer satisfaction is always a priority.129  
Gelb also mentions using biometric systems to identify individuals and 
specifically uses India’s Unique Identification Program as an example and explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of the program.130 Gelb recommends a tiered requirement 
for KYC based on the various banking needs.131  
The American Bankers Association’s journal published an article on using 
augmented intelligence to assist with KYC requirements. Using augmented intelligence 
connects a bank’s internal monitoring system with regulatory requirements.132 This 
system scans documents for possible regulation infractions and allows compliance 
officers to focus on specific areas.133 Augmented intelligence can assist with compliance 
management classifications, anti-money laundering systems, and KYC compliance.134  
4. Peer-to-Peer  
P2P solutions usually exchange or lend fiat or digital currency online without 
going through a centralized banking system. As consumers embrace the P2P marketplace, 
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the lack of technology to identify known buyers and sellers accurately becomes difficult. 
These exchange platforms create another opportunity for criminals to launder money. 
FinCEN advises that some new P2P exchangers fail to register as a money 
services business with inadequate anti-money laundering program. In 2015, FinCEN 
fined Ripple Labs, a P2P decentralized exchanger, $700,000 in civil money penalties for 
failing to register as a money services business and violating several requirements under 
the BSA.135 Furthermore, P2P exchangers act as money mixers to conceal or anonymize 
financial transactions further from law enforcement investigations.136 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), an independent monetary regulatory 
body in the United Kingdom, introduces additional regulations to P2P stakeholders 
designed to protect investors without hindering innovation or investment opportunities.137 
The FCA is limiting P2P investment agreements for new retail customers to 10% of 
investable assets.138 Several chief executives and managing directors working in the P2P 
lending space support the FCA ruling.139 This regulation ensures that investors are not 
overexposed to undue risk during P2P lending.  
On the other hand, many retail investors thought 10% was arbitrary and would 
reduce investment opportunities.140 Also, investors portray the revelation of financial 
information as intrusive and distasteful. Many investors will not release their financial 
data, which thus hinders innovation. Likewise, treating investors differently feels 
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unethical regarding financial exclusion, fair competition, and personal freedom.141 
Rhydian Lewis, the CEO of RateSetter, one of UK’s largest P2P investment platforms, 
supports the regulation.142 However, he states, “The limit on savers’ first investment is 
unnecessary and just patronizes normal people.”143 Politicians and regulators alike should 
carefully assess P2P platforms as another avenue to launder illicit fund.  
E. CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the literature, the bankers, regulators, and politicians all agree the 
BSA must be updated to address fintech and the various monetary reporting 
requirements. Terrorist financing and money launders are using innovative techniques to 
transfer funds while obfuscating law enforcement and intelligence services. With these 
new techniques for laundering money, U.S. law, specifically the BSA, must be updated to 
address these relevant issues. The Treasury Department, financial executives, regulators, 
politicians, privacy advocates, and law enforcement all have various interests and 
concerns regarding new regulations. Balancing these interests’ groups is a daunting but 
important duty for the stability of the U.S. financial sector. The remainder of this thesis 
explores various courses of action to increase the relevancy of the BSA, while carefully 
considering the perspective from those impacted most.  
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III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: H.R. 6068 
(COUNTER TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCE ACT) 
This chapter discusses possible changes to the BSA as addressed in the Counter 
Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act. This chapter specifically focuses on the reporting 
requirement of the CTRs and SARs required under current law. Should these monetary 
requirements remain the same or should the amounts be adjusted as stated in the counter-
terrorism act or should the monetary amounts be adjusted to account for inflation? The 
beneficiary ownership provision is also addressed along with the various arguments 
supporting and opposing this provision. A policy options criteria and matrix discusses 
several viewpoints with a detailed perspective from bank executives, law enforcement, 
and privacy advocates. Finally, an objective analysis addresses the monetary thresholds 
of the CTRs and SARs, along with the beneficiary ownership provision. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF COUNTER TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCE 
ACT 
The Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act is a legislative bill that alters 
specific monetary reporting requirements in the BSA. In June 2018, Representative 
Stevan Pearce introduced the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, formally known 
as H.R. 6068.144 This act increases the dollar amount for CTR requirements from $10,000 
to $30,000 and allows for the sharing of suspicious activities among financial groups.145 
The bill also requests that the Secretary of Treasury, along with federal LE agencies, 
review current reporting requirements under the BSA to reduce the current regulatory 
burdens on financial institutions.146 In overcoming these regulatory burdens, can fintech 
be used to assist the banking industry? 
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1. Goals 
The Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act address several current issues 
within the BSA. These issues include revising section Title 31 USC § 5313 from $10,000 
to $30,000 regarding currency transactions.147 Changing section Title 31 USC § 5318 (g) 
concerns increasing the threshold for suspicious activity reports from $5,000 to $10,000 
and each $2,000 amount to $3,000.148 Revising section Title 31 Code of Federal 
Regulations § 1010.100 (ff), which deals with money services business, such as foreign 
currency exchangers, check cashers, issuers of traveler’s checks or money orders, 
providers of prepaid access devices and money transmitters includes updating each 
$1,000 threshold to $3,000.149 Streamlining the reporting requirement for CTRs and 
SARs, sharing suspicious activities reports within a financial group to include foreign 
branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and encouraging the use of technological 
innovations is another revision.150 Addressing these various issues becomes complicated, 
especially when accounting for the stakeholders involved. 
2. Advantages 
The passage of the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act provides several 
advantages. The current regulatory standard and compliance costs associated with these 
regulations are harming all financial institutions, but more specifically, community banks 
and local broker dealers.151 Banks absorbing these substantial compliance costs 
eventually pass these monetary burdens onto their customers.152 Data obtained from the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors found compliance costs fell from 2016 to 2017, 
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but only for larger banks.153 During this same time frame, smaller community banks’ 
compliance costs increased.154 The BSA, out of all the stand-alone laws, was the most 
burdensome, which accounted for 22% of all compliance expenses.155 Policy Director 
Wesley Coopersmith stated: 
Rep. Pearce’s improved legislation takes important steps to modernize the 
BSA to foster improved compliance and reduce the burden imposed on the 
community banks and the small broker-dealers that serve main street 
America. The bill does so without creating a large compliance burden on 
small businesses and churches that could have resulted in as many as one 
million inadvertent felons.156  
Increasing the monetary threshold of the CTA and SAR will greatly alleviate the 
administrative burden placed on financial institutions that are ultimately passed onto their 
customers. 
Many legislators agree with streamlining reporting requirements to alleviate the 
heavy regulatory burden placed on the banking industry. On February 7, 2019, 
Representative Denver Riggleman introduced H.R. 1039 titled, “To streamline 
requirements for currency transaction reports and suspicious activity reports, and for 
other purposes” to the House Committee on Financial Services.157 This bill requires a 
thorough review of the reporting requirements mandated in the BSA by the Secretary of 
Treasury, along with other relevant stakeholders.158 The bill addresses explicitly if the 
CTR and SAR remain at the current monetary threshold, or are tied to inflation and 
periodically adjusted.159 Basically, Representative Rigglemen took sections 3 
(Streamlining Requirements for Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity 
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Reports) and 11 (Definitions) from H.R. 6068 and re-submitted the bill under H.R. 1039 
as sections 1 and 2. This new proposal discusses the need to streamline reporting. Chapter 
IV of this thesis, describes how fintech can assist.  
3. Limitations 
Raising the threshold for CTR allows illicit activity to increase even if the action 
is not directly associated with money laundering. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
uses CTR data for additional audit leads while examining individuals or organization for 
criminal or civil violations.160 From 2007–2009, the IRS generated $13.6 million from 
493 audits derived from CTRs.161 The IRS can also use the CTR data as an indicator of 
several compliance issues or uncovering businesses evading taxes.162 With the discovery 
of illicit activity, the IRS can use CTR data to detect and pursue individuals who would 
otherwise go unnoticed. Thus, keeping the current CTR requirement appears to be 
beneficial to the Treasury Department. 
4. Beneficial Ownership Debate 
Before the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act was introduced, the financial 
services committee stripped the beneficial ownership provision. This provision mandates 
that shell companies or front companies reveal their real beneficial owner, which has 
caused considerable debate.163 The Heritage Action for America supports the removal of 
the beneficial ownership provision because it “would have unfairly imposed large 
compliance burdens on small businesses, charities, and religious organizations.”164 
Others view stripping the beneficial ownership provision as reducing the impact of 
detecting money laundering effectively. 
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On one side of the debate, the Financial Accountability & Corporate 
Transparency (FACT) Coalition believes the beneficial ownership provision should be re-
inserted into the bill. FACT “is a non-partisan alliance of more than 100 state, national, 
and international organizations working toward a fair tax system that addresses the 
challenges of a global economy and promoting policies to combat the harmful impacts of 
corrupt financial practices.”165 FACT sent a detailed letter in June 2018 to the 
congressional sub-committee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance that detailed its concerns 
about the removal of the ownership provision.166 FACT concludes that incorporation 
transparency is paramount to alleviate world poverty, corruption, tax evasion, arms, and 
human trafficking.167 Confirming FACT’s assessment, OXFAM International, a global 
independent charitable organization, states, “The 50 biggest U.S. companies stashed $1.6 
trillion offshore in 2015, while Europe’s 20 biggest banks are registered over a quarter of 
their profits in tax havens—an estimated €25 billion ($28 billion) in 2015.”168 Based on 
these statistics, striking the beneficial ownership provision appears irresponsible.  
The Department of Treasury acknowledges the importance of obtaining 
beneficial ownership information. In 2016, the Department of Treasury 
stated, “Illicit actors may well set up complex webs of shell companies or 
structure their ownership so as to increase the difficulty of determining the 
individual who in fact owns the entity; it is because of this vulnerability 
that legal entities are also required to provide the name of one natural 
person under the control prong. And while a criminal may well lie 
regarding a legal entity’s beneficial ownership information, verification of 
the identity of the natural person(s) identified as a beneficial owner will 
limit her ability to do so in a meaningful way such that she could avoid 
scrutiny entirely. Furthermore, as the Department of Justice has noted 
throughout this rulemaking process, a falsified beneficial ownership 
identification would be valuable evidence in demonstrating criminal 
intent. Even the verified identity of a natural person whose status as a 
beneficial owner has not been verified provides law enforcement and 
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regulatory authorities with an investigatory lead from whom they can 
develop an understanding of the legal entity.169  
The Departments of Treasury and Justice both realize the implications of not disclosing 
the true identity of a beneficiary. 
The Financial Integrity Network also supports the disclosure of beneficial owners. 
On November 2017, President Chip Poncy testified before the House Financial Services 
Committee.170 Poncy demanded transparency and a systemic reporting of beneficial 
ownership information, along with a clear definition of the term.171 His arguments concur 
with the Treasury Department’s view in harmonizing the requirements of beneficial 
ownership.  
On the other side of the debate, the beneficial ownership provision was removed 
from the original bill and replaced by a requirement by the Comptroller General of the 
United States. The Comptroller is “to submit a report evaluating the effectiveness of the 
collection of beneficial ownership information under the CDD [Customer Due Diligence] 
rule”172 This provision was removed to give the Comptroller time to evaluate the 
effectiveness in collecting ownership information properly. 
The American Bar Association (ABA) also agreed with the removal of the 
beneficial ownership provision. The ABA claims the requirement would impose a 
burdensome regulation on millions of small businesses.173 Limited liability companies 
(LLCs) and other small corporations or their lawyers would be required to submit 
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extensive information about the real owner.174 The companies would also be required to 
update the data continuously and be subject to civil or criminal penalties for a lack of 
compliance.175 The ABA further states this personal information could be passed along to 
FinCEN, federal, or foreign governmental agencies.176 FinCEN would be required to 
maintain a secure database that could be subject to a future cyberattack that could thus 
disclose sensitive information about a business.177 The ABA believed the provision 
would even weaken the current anti-money laundering tools by suspending the new CDD 
rule.178 Based on all these drawbacks, the ABA determined that the beneficial ownership 
provision would be an additional regulatory burden on small businesses with minimal or 
no benefits. 
The ABA and the Financial Integrity Network agree that defining beneficial 
ownership is essential for clarification among businesses, regulators, and financial 
institutions. They contend the term is overly broad and vague. Company formation 
authorities may interpret the definition of beneficial ownership differently under the CDD 
rule.179 Whether supporting or opposing the regulation of beneficial ownership, many 
agree the term should be clearly defined.  
B. POLICY ANALYSIS 
1. Policy Options Criteria 
The policy options criteria follow Eugene Bardach’s steps to a practical policy 
options analysis. The policy options criteria consist of measuring the current $10,000 
CTR requirement that exists in the BSA.180 The CTR threshold, as mentioned in the 
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Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, would increase to $30,000.181 Should the 
current regulations be adjusted for inflation? The Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation 
calculator shows that $10,000 in October 1970 is equal to $63,866 in January 2019.182 
This thesis rounds the monetary requirement to $60,000 to account for inflation. The 
financial threshold for SAR is $5,000.183 According to the Department of Labor, 
adjusting the $5,000 limit for inflation equals approximately $30,000.184 Finally, the 
beneficial ownership provision is assessed. The matrix addresses the risk to public safety, 
costs to the banking industry, impact on law enforcement, and political opposition. 
a. Risk to Public Safety 
Measuring the threat to public safety is difficult to assess accurately. The 
mitigating factors associated with the CTRs and SARs can have a dramatic effect on 
public safety, as these requirements allow law enforcement to pursue suspicious behavior 
actively. Providing a statistical analysis on the results of these requirements is not 
currently captured accurately and can lead to the seizure of funds or arrests derived 
directly from a bank filing. To rate the risk, a sliding scale must be used to classify the 
risk in terms of general applications. A “low” in the matrix refers to the risk of reporting 
the transactions to FinCEN in regards to public safety. A “high” represents an increased 
risk to the public for failing to report illicit activity.  
b. Cost to the Banking Industry 
The regulatory costs for financial intuitions are a heavy burden. This unit 
measures the cost of filing CTR or SARs in terms of low, medium, and high. A specific 
dollar amount is not utilized, as the data for filing these reports vary depending on 
accuracy, thoroughness, and complexity.  
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c. Impact on Law Enforcement 
Does the current reporting requirement affect LE’s ability to pursue criminals 
involved in financial fraud? A sliding scale from low to high is also used to rate this 
impact. “Low” has minimal impact on LE detection and “high” has a more significant 
outcome for LE operations.  
d. Political Opposition 
Political opposition is classified by the likelihood that elected officials will not 
pass the selected reporting requirement. Elected officials consider the public base, 
political environment, and critical stakeholders and realize that being greatly opposed 
does not result in a favorable vote for the enacted change in the law. The criteria for this 
unit of measurement are also abstract, but this area needs to be addressed for any bill’s 
passage. “Low” represents a politically acceptable requirement. “High” represents a 
regulatory requirement unlikely to pass, or major outside pressures result to negate the 
passage. 
2. Policy Options Matrix 
Table 1 displays the risks to public safety, costs to the banks, the impact on law 
enforcement, and the level of political opposition. A sliding scale of low, medium, and 









Table 1. Monetary Thresholds 









$10,000 Low High Low High 
CTR 
$30,000 Medium Medium Medium Medium 
CTR 
$60,000 Medium Low Medium Low 
SAR  
$5,000 Low High Medium Medium 
SAR 




Low Medium Low Medium 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the various major party views impacted by the legal 
proposal. The bank executives or bankers, law enforcement, and privacy advocates have 
strong opinions regarding the changes to CTRs, SARs, and the beneficial ownership 
provision. 
1. Bank Executives 
The changes to the BSA primarily affect bankers. Currently, to remain compliant, 
the overhead costs of training bank employees, paying salaries, and providing benefits 
stretch the financial burden of the banking industry. The banking executives support any 
relief in regards to the regulatory burden. Thus, bankers support the $60,000 CTR and the 
$30,000 SAR threshold to alleviate costs. Clarification within the BSA reveals beneficial 
ownership will add to the regulatory burden on the banking industry. The Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) provides guidance, standards, and 
uniformity regarding the due diligence of obtaining the beneficiary owner of a 
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company.185 Even so, FinCEN and law enforcement prefer a strict definition, regulatory 
enforcement, and specific fines placed within the BSA for clarification. 
2. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement prefers access to CTRs and SARs without going through the 
judicial process of obtaining subpoenas or search warrants. Law enforcement is not 
attempting to circumvent the legal process or abuse individual privacy, but with the rapid 
and increase movement of illicit funds, following the legal process becomes an 
administrative burden. The legal process slows the investigative process and reduces the 
likelihood of seizing money. The movement of money continues to accelerate with 
fintech, and by the time law enforcement follows the legal process, the funds have 
already changed financial institutions or been moved internationally. Thus, law 
enforcement supports the lower threshold requirements associated with CTRs and SARs. 
The higher thresholds allow money launderers to go undetected, which leads to the 
retrieval of stolen funds as highly unlikely. FinCEN and law enforcement also support the 
beneficial ownership provision in the BSA. This provision enables FinCEN to trace 
money used for terrorist financing effectively and reveal the rightful owner of the funds.  
3. Privacy Advocates 
Privacy advocates align more with the banking industry than law enforcement, but 
for different reasons. Privacy activists believe the judicial process is circumvented when 
law enforcement receives information directly from the financial institutions. The legal 
process provides a check and balance, so that law enforcement does not overstep its 
enforcement boundaries or abuse its authority. Thus, the advocates support a lower 
threshold of CTR and SARS and have admittingly opposed increasing the monetary limit 
since the inception of the law. Furthermore, privacy advocates also believe the beneficial 
ownership provision should not be added to the BSA. They supported the successful 
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removal of the beneficial ownership from the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act, 
which caused an outcry among law enforcement. 
D. ANALYSIS  
All three fractions provide legitimate concerns regarding the various monetary 
thresholds and the beneficial ownership provision. With the significant movement of 
funds without accounting for inflation, the banking industry incurs an enormous financial 
burden that needs to be alleviated. Law enforcement also has a legitimate concern, as the 
increase in reporting thresholds and fintech allow criminals to move money without 
detection and obfuscate law enforcement authorities.  
Increasing the CTR requirement benefits the banking industry, and privacy 
advocates support a less restrictive requirement. On the other hand, this increase provides 
minimal benefit to LE efforts. Of note, a majority of the CTRs is actually legitimate and 
law enforcement can always utilize the legal process to obtain evidence.  
Changing the SAR requirement seems irresponsible in detecting the flow of illicit 
money, as internal bank investigators need a legal avenue and framework for reporting 
these activities. Bank investigators should report suspicious activity to FinCEN without 
concern for the monetary threshold. Financial schemes continue to increase, and the 
banking industry is the primary source of detecting and reporting these activities. As law 
enforcement continues to use the legal process, it is often hindered by the lack of insight 
into suspicious activity. Therefore, law enforcement cannot apply the legal process, and 
increasing the threshold will significantly hinder criminal investigations.  
The privacy advocates make a valid argument based on law enforcement 
bypassing the legal process. On the other hand, the risk needs to be weighted between 
circumventing the legal process and allowing criminals to move funds without any 
deterrent of being arrested. Bank investigators realize suspicious activity is ongoing, and 
they need a legal mechanism to report this activity without repercussions from privacy 
groups, customers, or other legal action. 
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Regarding the beneficial ownership provisions, bank executives realize the initial 
upfront administrative costs are burdensome, but once the account, loan, or acquisition is 
set up, overhead costs are minimal. Revealing the beneficiary owner allows law 
enforcement more opportunities to trace and detect illicit funds and work more 
effectively with international LE partners. The ABA provides a legitimate but feeble 
argument about the regulatory burden on millions of small businesses.186 The ABA offers 
no statistical evidence regarding the “millions” of small businesses. Once the financial 
accounts are established, and the beneficiary owner is revealed, the regulatory burden is 
minimal unless ownership is changed. 
The next chapter addresses specific fintech that banks can utilize to detect money 
laundering, tax evasion, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, as well as how 
criminals use fintech to move illicit funds. 
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IV. FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
Financial technology has been used prolifically over the last decade, so much so 
that the term financial technology has been shortened to fintech. Fintech uses software 
and modern technology to provide specific solutions within the financial services 
sector.187 Currently, the BSA does not adequately address this advanced technology. This 
chapter begins with a definition and description of ML technology and the ability to 
detect suspicious activity by financial institutions. This section includes the advantages 
and disadvantages of this technology and a discussion of whether it should be mandated 
within the BSA. 
The following section focuses on digital currency and the impact the digital 
currency market is having throughout the financial sector. Should digital currency have 
stricter regulations based on criminals using this currency to transfer funds to avoid 
detection? The following section also addresses “KYC,” as well as can the fintech 
industry assist with identifying your customer.  
The final section in the chapter addresses P2P payment systems and their ability 
to move illicit funds. The chapter concludes with a policy-option criterion and a matrix 
discussing the options discussed in this chapter.  
1. Machine Learning 
Fraud detection is an ongoing and challenging problem for financial institutions. 
Only 50% of money laundering or terrorist financing was detected by internal currency 
alerts.188 The banking industry also has difficulty hiring experienced staff to detect or 
comply with AML regulations.189 With these two significant issues, this section focuses 
on fintech called ML to address these concerns. The technological advances of ML can 
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process large amounts of data to detect fraudulent activity that thus assists financial 
institutions. Like most technical words, ML is defined differently by the various sectors 
using the technology. It is understood to be a subset of AI that processes massive 
amounts of data leading to a decision in milliseconds.190 In the financial sector, “machine 
learning is trained to recognize normal transactions within the data and then identify all 
deviations and anomalies in real-time.”191 A ML system receives a large data source and 
cleans the data or removes any data irrelevant to the end goal.192 Scientists then analyze 
the data to ensure that enough target attributes exist.193 If so, the data scientist selects 
measurable characteristics in the ML model, while testing and evaluating the accuracy of 
the guiding algorithm.194 Using this relatively new technology, financial institutions can 
detect suspicious activity instead of paying a traditional analyst.  
A subsection of artificial intelligence, ML, is broken down further into two major 
categories, supervised and unsupervised models.195 Supervised ML models are the most 
common in the financial sector.196 A data scientist feeds information into the model and 
tags the transaction as either legitimate or fraudulent behavior.197 Over time, the machine 
correlates the data with individual behavior.198 As more training data is fed into the 
machine, the more accurate the model becomes.199 Unsupervised ML is more 
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complicated. Unlike supervised machines, the data entered into an unsupervised model is 
not labeled or categorized as legitimate or fraudulent activity.200 The network learns 
normal behaviors, consistencies, and trends from the data.201 The machine then issues 
alerts about any anomalies falling outside the given parameters.202 The anomalies or 
outliers are categorized as suspicious or fraudulent activity. A troubling concern is only 
half of the identified suspicious activity are currently being detected by current 
monitoring systems.203 Financial institutions can utilize either supervised or unsupervised 
ML to detect suspicious activity more efficiently.  
a. Advantages 
As stated previously, using ML technology provides several advantages. ML can 
be used to detect a variety of suspicious activities and abnormal behavioral patterns.204 
Individuals from the University of British Colombia, Amazon AI, and Yahoo Research 
even believe ML can effectively predict legitimate accounts that may be more susceptible 
to suspicious activities in the future.205 Various private sector solutions are also available, 
such as Verafin, which use technology to monitor transactions across several channels to 
uncover criminal activity or possible terrorist financing.206 ML can identify trends or 
abnormal behavior quicker than those typically going undetected by rule-based traditional 
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detection methods.207 Over time, humans become complacent, bored, or just lazy. On the 
other hand, machines improve with efficiency and accuracy, which leads to detecting 
illegal activity better, and thus saving banks and customers money.  
b. Challenges 
ML technology is constantly evolving and far from perfect. The technology has a 
steep learning curve, and the amount of time and data needed to create an effective model 
is beyond the investment of many banking risk teams.208 Though ML can detect 
abnormal activity, it does not always discover suspicious behaviors and can produce 
false-positive results. It can reduce the number of staff hours required to authenticate a 
transaction; however, only human intelligence can review the data to determine a 
legitimate or suspicious transaction. ML solutions rely on highly skilled and well-trained 
data scientists working together as a team.209 The team continuously adjusts the 
controlling algorithm to reduce the number of false-positives.210 Detecting suspicious 
activity and reducing the number of false-positives is a constant issue with this fintech.  
Unsupervised ML can lead to additional issues for bank executives. As 
unsupervised machines detect false-positive transactions, the controlling algorithm 
identifies the transaction as fraudulent.211 However, problems arise as the transaction is 
actually authentic and the machine continues to learn incorrectly, which creates 
additional false-positives.212 This type of learning reinforces a deficient decision matrix, 
and can quickly lead to multiple false-positives if the model is not resolved soon.213 Bank 
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executives need to be aware of these issues with unsupervised ML to maintain customer 
satisfaction if the controlling algorithm goes awry.  
ML solutions require constant feedback and programming by data science teams 
to both maintain consistent results and improve performance. Data scientists need to 
master several types of programming, or a company must employ an entire data science 
team.214 Using a complete data scientist team to ensure enhanced performance of the 
technology can be extremely costly for smaller financial institutions.  
Another ML limitation is called “black box decision making.” Data is processed 
through an intricate machine, and the algorithm declares the transactions suspicious 
without any knowledge of its internal working.215 Policy makers at financial institutions 
need to understand why specific transactions or accounts are reported as suspicious. 
Banking executives cannot see behind a sophisticated algorithm or propriety information 
if machines are declaring accounts suspicious.  
ML can be extremely costly to purchase, and implementing a sophisticated data-
analytical platform to detect suspicious activity can be complicated. Unfortunately, the 
cost to implement and maintain these systems is beyond the financial capability of 
community or smaller banks. 
2. Digital Currency 
Digital currency and virtual currency are usually used conjointly throughout the 
tech industry, even though they have minor differences. For this thesis, the definition of 
digital currency is defined as in H.R. bill 56. The bill defines digital currency as a “digital 
representation of value that is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or stored 
value; and is not an established legal tender.”216 Virtual currency was referred to as 
currency that could not buy a real commodity. Thus, currency in a video game is referred 
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to as virtual currency. Once a virtual currency could buy and sell goods, it became known 
as a digital currency.  
The San Francisco U.S. Attorney’s Digital Currency task force agreed with the 
digital currency definition and never used the word virtual currency, since it would never 
prosecute virtual currency crimes. The digital currency task force referred to digital 
currency as intangible but considered it real money even though it was not backed by fiat. 
Still, the U.S. Attorney’s offices and FinCEN use the terms digital and virtual currency 
interchangeably.  
When people think of digital currency, Bitcoin comes to everyone’s mind. Bitcoin 
has the largest market capitalization of any decentralized digital currency.217 Bitcoin is 
the first decentralized digital payment system. An individual known as Satoshi Namato 
invented Bitcoin.218 Bitcoin operates using blockchain technology and records all 
transactions on a public distributed ledger. People who own Bitcoin have a private key, 
which is similar to any private financial account password or personal identification 
number. This unique key allows them to sell or transfer their Bitcoin to a new owner, and 
the transaction is then recorded on the public ledger. Since no centralized authority exists, 
such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the digital currency uses “miners.” These computer 
enthusiasts maintain the public ledger, verify each transaction, and reconcile the ledger 
continuously.219 Even though Bitcoin is the most widely circulated digital currency, 
many other digital currencies are available, such as Ethereum, Ripple, Litecoin, and 
Monero, to name a few. The concept of having a decentralized payment system is very 
enticing to several citizens and entities.  
a. Advantages 
The uniqueness of Bitcoin or any digital currency is the owner does not rely on a 
third-party service like the federal banking system or a private company like PayPal or 
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Visa to move the funds. Digital currency can quickly move from P2P without oversight 
or regulation by a financial institution or the U.S. government. Digital currency is also 
not backed by gold, government fiat, or the U.S. government. People on the open market 
determine the value of digital currency, much like with stock prices.220 This movement of 
funds becomes enticing for citizens with the ideology that favors less or no government 
intervention or oversight. 
Since no centralized banking authority authorizes the movement of digital 
currency, the transactions are significantly cheaper. U.S. traditional payment systems 
require customers or merchants to pay a transaction fee to complete the transactions. 
Processing several thousand transactions daily can become expensive for businesses, and 
the corporation must account for this additional overhead cost.  
The movement of digital currency is quicker compared to the automated clearing 
house (ACH) of financial institutions. The ACH is an electronic funds clearing and 
settlement system that facilitates payments between consumers, businesses, and 
governments that clears $2 trillion daily.221 The “miners” of digital currency and the 
ACH perform similar functions.222 The National Automated Clearing House Association 
(NACHA) operates the ACH, with future plans for same-day ACH processing in 2021.223 
The NACHA is attempting to enhance its speed of processing transactions to compete 
with digital currency and increase customer satisfaction. Digital currency exchangers are 
usually slowed down when transferring funds from a fiat source to a digital currency 
based on the delay with ACH processing.224 One of the benefits of digital currency is the 
processing speed of transactions.  
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Digital currency also protects citizens and ensures financial privacy from 
repressive governments. Oppressed individuals benefit significantly from the ability to 
make private transactions to avoid scrutiny or oppression from a tyrannical 
government.225 Many Argentina citizens are moving toward digital currency to 
circumvent the high foreign exchange rate imposed by the government.226 Another reason 
Argentines are using digital currency is to remain anonymous and the privacy for holding 
U.S. dollars overseas without the knowledge of Argentinian regulators.227 Globally, 
Argentina is not considered an oppressive government, but its citizens now have the 
option to ensure financial privacy from what they deem to be an oppressive oversight. 
b. Law Enforcement Concerns 
Despite the numerous benefits of digital currency, some significant drawbacks 
remain. Digital currency has become an increasing concern for law enforcement and 
policymakers over the past decade. Criminals use digital currency to launder money and 
accept payment for illicit goods to remain anonymous and avoid LE detection. A few 
examples of illegal online marketplaces using digital currency in nefarious ways follow.  
• Silk Road, which operated on the Tor network from 2011–2013, “emerged 
as the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on the 
Internet, at the time.”228 It served, “as a sprawling black-market bazaar 
where unlawful goods and services… were bought and sold regularly” 
using the digital currency Bitcoin.229 “Silk Road was used by thousands of 
drug dealers and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of 
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kilograms of illegal drug dealers and other unlawful services to well over 
100,000 buyers, and launder hundreds of millions of dollars” using Bitcoin 
to remain anonymous.230 The owner of Silk Road earned a commission 
valued over $13 million from illegal online sales.231 Eventually, LE 
authorities seized millions of dollars in Bitcoin.232 The proceeds obtained 
from selling illegal goods online are so lucrative that one month after Silk 
Road was shut down by law enforcement, its predecessor, Silk Road 2.0, 
was operating.233 
• In July 2017, LE authorities seized the “largest criminal marketplace on 
the Internet, AlphaBay, which operated for over two years on the dark 
web.”234 The bazaar sold malware, hacking tools, counterfeit goods, 
fentanyl, heroin, other toxic chemicals, and firearms.235 During the final 
days of operation, it had over 350,000 unlawful listings with 40,000 
vendors.236 Digital currency was the method of exchange for goods and 
services, and millions of dollars in digital currency were seized.237 Chief 
Don Forst of the IRS stated, “AlphaBay was the world’s largest 
underground marketplace of the dark net, providing an avenue for 
criminals to conduct business anonymously and without repercussions.”238  
• According to Jeffrey Simser, the legal director at Ministry of the Attorney 
General for Canada, “Liberty Reserve allowed anonymous transfers 
                                                 
230 United States Attorney’s Office, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Extradition.” 
231 United States Attorney’s Office, “Ross Ulbricht, The Creator and Owner.” 
232 United States Attorney’s Office. 
233 “Operator of ‘Silk Road 2.0’ Website Charged in Manhattan Federal Court,” United States 
Attorney’s Office, May 13, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/operator-silk-road-20-website-
charged-manhattan-federal-court. 
234 “AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut Down,” United States Attorney’s Office, July 
20, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down. 
235 United States Attorney’s Office. 
236 United States Attorney’s Office. 
237 United States Attorney’s Office. 
238 United States Attorney’s Office. 
50 
around the world, operating like a virtual currency; when disrupted, there 
were 1 million users worldwide (200,000 in the USA) conducting 12 
million transactions annually.”239 The founder Arthur Budovsky 
developed “the largest payment processor and money transfer system” 
according to the defunct website.240 The purpose was to allow anonymous 
and untraceable illegal transactions to launder money globally using 
digital currency. Assistant Attorney General Caldwell stated the following 
after a guilty plea, “After a Prior conviction for operating an unlicensed 
money transmitting business, Budovsky developed Liberty Reserve, which 
quickly became a premier service used by criminals around the world to 
launder their criminal proceeds.”241 All together prosecutors alleged the 
company laundering approximately $6 billion even though he pleaded to 
$250 million.242  
• BTC-e, another enormous digital currency exchanger operated globally 
from 2011 to 2017.243 The internet-based money transmitter exchanges 
fiat currency with several digital currencies.244 The operator defendant, 
Alexander Vinnik, is charged in the Northern District of California for 
operating an international money-laundering scheme using digital 
currency.245 BTC-e conducted approximately $296 million in Bitcoin 
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transactions, and over 300,000 were traceable to theft.246 During the 
operation, BTC-e had no “KYC” processes or internal policy in place and 
failed to collect customer data.247  
As stated by these examples, criminals or money launderers utilize digital 
currency to conceal the origin of illegally obtained funds and avoid LE detection. Tracing 
the funding streaming from criminal organizations has always been an avenue for law 
enforcement to investigate. This tracking has now become more difficult and resource 
intensive with digital currency. Criminals have taken a step further with digital currency 
to conceal their nefarious activities. Perpetrators are now using mixers or tumblers to hide 
activity further. A tumbler is a service that mixes several transactions, which thus makes 
tracing impossible once the currency is intertwined with other funds.248 Bitcoin Blender 
touts a function to blend or mix digital currency to make the transaction 100% 
anonymous.249 This technology allows criminals to use another avenue to conceal their 
activities.  
During a digital currency conference hosted by the Department of Justice in 
November 2015, FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery stated:  
FinCEN was the first regulator to address virtual currency. But we only 
opened the door for the hundreds of other questions beyond our anti-
money laundering perspectives. It is vitally important that government 
regulators and law enforcement agencies engage with leaders of the virtual 
[digital] currency sector to make sure we understand each other.250  
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Acting U.S. Attorney Brian Stretch echoed Calvery’s response during a keynote address 
stating, “As emerging technologies such as digital currency and block chains expand into 
new and legitimate applications, it becomes all the more critical for industry leaders and 
government agencies to share insights and perspectives in order to combat the illicit use 
of these technologies.”251 Thus, the BSA needs to address the regulation of digital 
currency.  
Based on the expanding use of digital currency, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San 
Francisco created the first Digital Currency Task Force consisting of the U.S. Secret 
Service, Homeland Security Investigations, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and local law enforcement 
partners to combat the illicit use of digital currency.252 This task force focuses on 
criminals using digital currency to launder funds and addresses this growing threat 
landscape. 
Much confusion has occurred over the years, and clarification has been needed to 
address digital currency. On March 18, 2013, FinCEN issued this interpretive guide: 
to clarify the applicability of the regulations implementing the Bank 
Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, 
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies. Such persons are 
referred to in this guidance as “users,” “administrators,” and “exchangers,” 
all as defined below. A user of virtual currency is not an MSB under 
FinCEN’s regulations and therefore is not subject to MSB registration, 
reporting, and recordkeeping regulations. However, an administrator or 
exchanger is an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations, specifically, a money 
transmitter, unless a limitation to or exemption from the definition applies 
to the person. An administrator or exchanger is not a provider or seller of 
prepaid access, or a dealer in foreign exchange, under FinCEN’s 
regulations.253  
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FinCEN provided further regulations from users engaged in “mining” bitcoin. According 
to FinCEN, miners are not subject to AML oversight.254 On the other hand, “those who 
mine Bitcoins and sell them to someone else are subjected to AML oversight as money 
transmitters.”255 The lines between a user, administrator, and exchanger can become 
blurred depending on an individual’s point of view. Digital currency needs to be updated 
in the BSA to provide clear guidance for miners, administrators, exchanger, regulators, 
policymakers, and law enforcement. 
Foreign law enforcement is also having difficulty with digital currency. The 
National Crime Agency (NCA) from the United Kingdom claims the money is being 
used to launder smaller amounts, but at high volumes.256 The NCA has made three 
observations.257 First, digital currency is used in extortion-type crimes like ransomware 
in which victims pay cybercriminals.258 Second, it aids the growth of cybercrime-related 
services.259 Criminals use digital currency to exchange illicit tools or goods among 
different crime families.260 Lastly, digital currency is used to launder money throughout 
cybercriminal networks.261 The NCA is expecting the use of digital currency to grow as 
the need to cash-out or change digital currency to a fiat currency increases.262 The 
growing concern of using digital currency is a continual issue throughout international 
law enforcement.  
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3. Know Your Customer Using Technology 
KYC has become a common term within the banking industry. KYC is often 
referred to as CIP, as mentioned in the USA PATRIOT Act under Section 326.263 This 
section allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to set forth regulations on bankers 
regarding the identification of customers opening new accounts.264 The customer 
identification program or the term used now as KYC was purposely left vague to allow 
the banking industry flexibility in implementing this requirement.265 The KYC portions 
of the USA Patriot Act were used to verify new customers and not focus on longtime 
loyal customers.266 With the development of fintech, now KYC can be explored in a new 
realm that balances customer satisfaction with compliance. 
With the development of new technology, individuals can open bank accounts and 
transfer money without appearing at a local bank. This same technology allows criminals 
to move illicit money throughout the financial system while providing limited 
identification to banks. Appropriate KYC rules governing financial institutions are 
crucial in maintaining financial integrity to identify the source of money.267 The BSA 
needs to provide banks with a minimum standard for a client to open an account. These 
rules should ensure consistency among local and national banks, while carefully 
considering the implications of international banking. Within those standards, the KYC 
rules should not hinder innovation or cause undue friction in setting up an account. In this 
day and age, customers request a proper balance between convenience and usability.  
Three primary steps are followed to identify customers when dealing with KYC 
rules. First, the information must be collected. Second, the institutions need to verify the 
data, and lastly, the information should be authenticated through a government database 
or a trusted third party. KYC must be dynamic and continuously authenticating 
                                                 
263 USA PATRIOT ACT, 317. 
264 USA PATRIOT ACT, 317. 
265 Cocheo, “Flexible Patriot Rules,” 52. 
266 Cocheo, 54. 
267 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering 
Examination Manual, 3. 
55 
transactions and detecting suspicious activity.268 Particular focus should be on businesses 
conducting transactions with insufficient AML regulations.269 Being able to analyze 
transfers between two accounts should be a requirement under the KYC rule.270 All these 
steps need to be implemented appropriately for strict KYC rules to be effective. In 
addition, various methods are available for collecting, verifying, and authenticating 
information.  
The financial cost for increasing regulations as mentioned previously should also 
be addressed when dealing with KYC regulations. According to a Thomson Reuters 
survey, “the costs and complexity of KYC are rising.”271 Financial firms are spending 
millions of dollars in KYC compliance, and some larger financial institutions are 
spending $500 million on compliance costs.272 Financial institutions may increase KYC 
compliance and reduce overhead costs by using fintech. 
a. Biometrics 
KYC can also use biometrics to include fingerprint, retina, facial, finger vein 
recognition. Two major issues have been identified with using biometrics. The “false 
acceptance of an invalid identity claim (possibly fraud)” and the “false rejection of a 
valid identity claim (unwarranted denial of service).”273 Another issue is the failure to 
capture a biometric because of a software or hardware failure.274 Costs, system 
performance, reliability, and convenience are concerns in using this technology. 
However, biometrics could be a beneficial avenue as a KYC initiative as technology 
continues to develop and accessibility increases. 
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b. Distributed Ledger Technology 
In 2017, two researchers wrote a paper on distributed ledger technology (DLT) to 
assist with KYC due diligence and reduce the cost of compliance within the banking 
industry. The researchers explained that customers or businesses would only go through 
the verification process with one financial institution.275 The verification data would then 
be added to a decentralized interbank ledger to allow any financial intuition to obtain the 
data and reduce the duplication process of KYC.276 The ledger would act as a single point 
of verification and authentication for other banks, much like blockchain technology with 
digital currency.277 DLT technology has future potential, but financial institutions need to 
conduct further testing.  
c. Tiered KYC Requirement—Risk Based Approach 
In dealing with the KYC requirement, the level of due diligence by the banks 
should be proportional to the amount of risk. With the advancement of technology, banks 
can use fintech to assist with a tiered or risk-based approach. The Financial Crimes Task 
Force (FCTF) is an “inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to 
protect the global financial system again money laundering, terrorist financing and the 
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”278 The FCTF recommends a 
risk-based approach to mitigate money laundering with high-risk countries.279 Whereas, 
countries with a lower-risk score would be allowed to simplify their KYC requirements 
to allow for financial inclusion.280 Using a risk-based approach should focus on the 
prevention or mitigation of money laundering.  
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A few customer risk factors mentioned by the FCTF of banks to consider are as 
follows: 
• Business relationship involves unusual circumstances 
• Customers are located outside the United States 
• Legal persons are used as personal asset-holding vehicles 
• Companies are cash-intensive 
• Business ownership structure is unusual or complex 
• Countries with an inadequate AML system 
• Countries subject to embargos or sanctions 
• Countries known for being corrupt or significant criminal activity 
• Anonymous transactions 
• Payments received from unknown third parties281 
Having a risk-based approach allows financial institutions to deal differently with small 
or large customers without hindering the development of start-ups or smaller businesses. 
Compliance expenses for KYC can be relatively high for startup companies with a 
minimal profit margin. 
In dealing with a risk-based approach, India has a diverse population that deals 
with a wide range of social classes from extreme poverty to very wealthy. India also has a 
unique technology component within its county. The country developed the Unique 
Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to “allocate an exclusive identification number 
to over 1.2 billion people.”282 This 12-digit identification number satisfies the verification 
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process for social and financial inclusion.283 To obtain this unique number, Indian 
citizens must provide their “name, address, date of birth, gender, photograph and 
biometric data (iris scans and fingerprints.)”284 The authentication process uses this 12-
digit number or Aadhaar card along with the biometrics of the citizen. This new 
identification system enhances security and financial inclusion from the old paper, forged 
documents, and slow, inefficient system for verification and authentication.285 India also 
demanded citizens opening a bank account must acquire an Aadhaar card within a 
year.286 The new system allowed citizens’ social and financial inclusion, even in 
impoverished areas or with socially excluded populations.287 Before this system, the 
depressed areas never had access to legal documents like birth certificates; thus, they 
were unable to access India’s financial system. The use of biometrics technology 
addressed gaps within their current system and allowed for reliable cash transfers, 
reduced the proliferation of fraud, and mitigated identity theft.288 Of course, an extensive 
biometric system controlled by the government may exceed the scope comfortable by 
most privacy advocates or other citizens attempting to keep their biometrics from a 
government-run network. 
4. Peer-to-Peer 
With the development of the fintech industry, access to mobile money and P2P 
transfers continue to increase; “87 percentage of merchants support either mobile site or 
mobile application for online shopping or both.”289 As more consumers and merchants 
embrace P2P networks solutions, such as Zelle, ApplePay, Venmo, PayPal, Google 
Wallet, Square Cash, Facebook Messenger, and other fintech companies, criminals are 
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allowed another platform to exploit or launder illicit funds. With these new 
developments, FinCEN has just started imposing civil penalties against P2P exchangers 
involved in the movement of digital currency.  
Based on these new platforms, FinCEN is beginning to penalize individuals acting 
as a money service business. In April 2019, FinCEN levied a punitive fine against a 
California citizen, Eric Powers.290 Powers operated as a P2P exchanger for digital 
currency and failed to register as a money services business under the BSA.291 According 
to FinCEN, “’money transmitters,’ peer-to-peer exchangers are required to comply with 
the BSA obligations that apply to MSBs [money service business], including registering 
with FinCEN; developing, implementing, and maintaining an effective AML program; 
filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Currency Transaction (CTRs); and 
maintaining certain records.”292 Powers conducted over 200 financial transactions of over 
$10,000 and failed to file CTRs.293 FinCEN fined Powers $35,000 who agreed no longer 
to operate as a money service business.294 This case is significant, as it is the first law 
enforcement action again a P2P digital currency exchanger.  
Many P2P services meet the definition of financial institutions or money 
transmitters under the BSA/AML rules, as defined by FinCEN. The BSA should clearly 
define P2P services. Many fintech P2P services are not maintaining an adequate KYC 
program, anti-money laundering program, or filing appropriate CTRs. With P2P services, 
criminal organizations can store multiple payment cards from various banks on the same 
device and transfer funds through these different cards while staying under the CTR 
requirement. P2P services should report the transferring of funds from one device to 
another when the amount accumulates to $10,000. P2P services can simply transfer 
money among separate banks to avoid reporting requirements. The BSA should address 
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P2P transactions by using not only specific payment cards but also the international 
mobile equipment identity (IMEI). The IMEI number is a 15-digit serial number stored in 
the mobile phone memory.295 Every mobile phone is assigned this globally unique 
number that is recorded by the manufacturer.296 Mobile devices also have a unique 15-
digit international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) account number stored in the SIM 
card.297 This global number allows for roaming on service provider networks.298 The 
third identifier within mobile devices is the integrated circuit card identifier (ICCID). The 
ICCID is a unique serial number assigned to the SIM card and usually consists of 19 or 
20 characters.299 Regulators must hold P2P payment services more accountable by 
increased monitoring and using fintech to detect the movement of illicit funds by 
mandating P2P services monitor not only payment cards, but also phone devices through 
IMEI, IMSI, and ICCID for fraud detection. 
B. TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS 
1. Policy Options Criteria 
The policy options criteria on technology also follow Eugene Bardach’s steps to a 
practical policy options analysis. The policy options criteria consist of measuring the 
various types of fintech to be addressed in the BSA. The first is ML technology, and 
whether financial institutions should mandate this type of technology to increase their 
fraud detection capabilities. Second, digital currency is the new money exchange of 
choice among many criminals and money launders. FinCEN has issued several alerts and 
policies regarding digital currency, but should this new form of currency also be 
addressed in the BSA to provide digital currency users, miners, and exchangers 
clarification? Third, the matrix discusses three KYC approaches, with a focus on 
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biometrics, (DLT, and a RBA. Finally, P2P technology regarding the monitoring of 
IMEI, IMSI, and ICCID is presented.  
2. Technology Criteria 
The matrix addresses the complexity of the technology, costs to banks, privacy 
concerns, and political opposition. 
a. Complexity 
Using new technology can be extremely easy to implement and requires minimal 
maintenance. Other technology can be extremely complex and challenging to evaluate 
statically, implement, and maintain. Complexity is rated on a broad scale of “low” being 
non-complex, and “high” being extremely complex to implement and maintain. 
b. Cost to Banks 
Anytime increased regulatory costs for financial intuitions are a possibility, this 
criterion should be considered. This unit of measurement is assessed in terms of low, 
medium, and high in relation to the costs of implementing and maintaining the 
technology. It is not designated with a specific monetary amount, as the costs of the 
implementation and maintenance of technology continually adjusts. 
c. Privacy 
Privacy in this matrix not only deals with personally identifiable information 
(PII), but also general information obtained from big data, and more specifically, 
behavioral analytics. In dealing with new technology, biometrics, or other personal data, 
a constant struggle or balance occurs between security and risk. This section rates the 
concerns of privacy from an advocates’ perspective and their tolerance for accepting 
security over confidentiality. The unit of measurement is low, medium, and high, whereas 
low refers to little opposition from the privacy advocates and high refers to absolute 
objection and concern. Even though this scale can be subjective depending on the 
individual or group, the rating is objective, and based on the general view of the activists. 
62 
d. Political Opposition 
As stated in the previous chapter, since the BSA requires congressional approval, 
political acceptance, or opposition, needs to be addressed. Political acceptance is 
classified by the likelihood that elected officials will pass the selected fintech. Thus, 
political opposition is the likelihood that officials will not support the technology. Elected 
officials consider their public base, political environment, and critical stakeholders and 
realize that being greatly opposed will not provide an affirmative vote. The criteria for 
this unit of measurement are also abstract, but this area needs to be addressed for any bill 
passage. The rating is based on the likelihood of passage. “Low” represents a politically 
acceptable requirement. “High” represents a regulatory requirement unlikely to pass, or 
high outside pressures result to negate the passage.  
3. Technology Option Matrix 
Table 2 measures the various types of fintech to be addressed in the BSA. 
Table 2. Financial Technology 




Learning High High High High 
Digital 
Currency Low Medium Medium Low 
KYC 
Biometrics Low Low Medium Medium 
KYC 
DLT High High High High 
KYC 
RBA Low Medium Medium Low 
P2P 




This section discusses the various viewpoints from the major parties involved by 
the legal proposal of fintech in the BSA. The bank executives, law enforcement, and 
privacy advocates have the strongest opinions regarding the implementation requirement 
of fintech in the BSA.  
1. Bank Executives 
In dealing with changes to the BSA, bank executives are primarily concerned 
about the costs associated with compliance. The financial burden placed on the banking 
industry is enormous, and the bankers pass those compliance burdens onto their 
customers to maintain a profitable business model. Requiring the implementation of 
advanced technology like ML and distributed ledger technology is very concerning to 
bankers, as seen in the matrix. Community banks or smaller banks will be extremely 
troubled by the implementation and maintenance costs, as well as the risk of using 
technology to maintain customer satisfaction. The smaller financial institutions may 
understand the benefits, but the costs of training skilled data scientists and maintaining 
their skillset is more than most can afford.  
To use these advanced technologies, community banks need to outsource the 
technology to a private third party or join other financial institutions or an association like 
the Pacific Coast Bankers Bank (PCBB) to share the costly burden. The PCBB was 
created to assist smaller community-based banks with competitively priced banking 
solutions and services.300 The PCBB and other similar organizations may assist with 
advanced technology solutions like ML or distributed ledger technology in the future to 
distribute the costly service.  
2. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is indifferent to the various types of fintech used to detect or 
thwart money launderers; it needs the ability for banks to detect, retain the evidence, and 
report the suspicious activity promptly. Law enforcement is highly concerned with digital 
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currency, as the various cryptocurrencies have become the currency of choice among 
criminals. Due to this new way of transferring illicit funds, law enforcement prefers 
regulation that allows easier detection and monitoring of these transactions. As law 
enforcement improves its tracing techniques for digital currency like Bitcoin, criminals 
are migrating to digital currencies, like Monero, which provide a higher degree of 
anonymity and privacy to obfuscate law enforcement.  
3. Privacy Advocates 
Privacy advocates are continuously concerned with government security 
establishments and any regulations that threaten information privacy. As seen in the 
matrix, the activists are concerned with any technology involving personal information. 
Thus, no “low” ratings result, and the evaluation of medium and high are based strictly 
on the amount of privacy data retrieved or stored by the technology. The amount of 
personal data and behavior analytics obtained from ML technology and distributed ledger 
technology are of significant concern. The data stored using this advanced technology 
could jeopardize an individual’s privacy if stolen or used illicitly. The other technologies 
examined were rated as medium, as the data obtained is not less important, but the 
amount of data stored is less in comparison to the other fintech solutions.  
D. ANALYSIS  
The three separate groups affected by the implementation all have legitimate 
concerns that should carefully be considered when enacting a legislative law or change. 
Incorporating or mandating the use of fintech can have a profound effect on banking 
institutions. Prescribing any change should be carefully considered, as the monetary 
burden will eventually be placed on the consumer. 
ML is extremely innovative with great potential for detecting suspicious activity. 
Financial institutions could benefit greatly from ML platforms if appropriately 
implemented. The technology is tremendously sophisticated, and monitoring costs are 
high, not only for the platform but to maintain data scientists with the proper training and 
expertise. ML solutions can provide accurate results if the data is harvested correctly and 
used appropriately. Based on the data needed to operate these platforms effectively, 
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privacy advocates have a legitimate concern about machines collecting transactional data 
without permission from their customers. Using this data to make a determination if a 
transaction is valid or illegal, poses yet another issue. With all the complications, the 
likelihood of Congress mandating the use of this technology is extremely low.  
Law enforcement also has a legitimate concern regarding the unlawful use of 
digital currency. This new form of money allows criminals to circumvent financial 
institutions and avoid scrutiny. Thus, enacting regulations on digital currency exchangers 
and miners have little effect on bank executives, but can significantly reduce illicit 
financing if appropriately implemented. The political opposition to regulating digital 
currency is relatively low, and FinCEN has already provided guidance for digital 
currency exchangers, even though the regulations should be addressed in the BSA.  
Using fintech to address the KYC regulations are wide-ranging with various 
implications depending on the type of technology. In using the distributed ledger 
technology, the same issue as ML arises. The technology is extremely sophisticated and 
requires constant monitoring from experienced data scientists. Also, the likelihood of 
Congress mandating this advanced technology is highly unlikely based on the costs and 
possible privacy implications. 
In dealing with biometrics and a risk-based approach in KYC, privacy is a 
concern, but not as high as capturing or maintaining several aspects of personal data. The 
primary concern with biometrics is the possibility of network intrusions and a 
transnational cybercriminal organization obtaining the database. Once in the hands of 
criminals, they will conduct social engineering or other cyber schemes to exploit 
individuals and businesses. Using a risk-based approach appears to be a realistic and 
acceptable form of practice with less implementation and administrative costs. The tiered 
approach would also address the various classes of citizens and receive political 
acceptance. 
Finally, regulations on P2P platforms have minimal costs to banks, and the ability 
to monitor IMEI, IMSI, or ICCID requires minimal software programming. Congress 
should receive little opposition to these regulations. Even though privacy advocates 
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would be opposed to this regulation, it would be minimal compared to the other fintech 
products mentioned.  
The next chapter provides specific recommendation regarding the various fintech 
products and also addresses the SARs, CTRs, and beneficial ownership provision from 
Chapter III.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Proponents and opponents of increased regulations all agree the BSA must be 
updated to address the monetary thresholds for CTRs and SARs, along with tackling the 
beneficial ownership provision and fintech. Addressing these complex issues to account 
for all the affected members or organizations involved is daunting. Before enacting 
legislation with devastating effects, lawmakers must carefully consider the proper 
balance of increased regulations to hinder money launderers versus the violations of 
citizens’ 4th Amendment protected privacy rights.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The BSA can be reformed to address emerging technology to prevent money 
laundering and illicit financing in several key ways: revise the monetary thresholds, add a 
beneficial ownership provision, and use fintech to uncover illicit finance. 
1. Currency Transaction Reports 
This thesis recommends raising the CTR monetary filing from $10,000 to 
$60,000, the rate of inflation. Furthermore, the BSA should grant the U.S. Secretary of 
Treasury the ability to raise the CTR monetary filing on a five-year basis to adjust for 
inflation. 
The monetary requirement of the CTRs under the BSA has been debated for years 
by the various interest groups. One area of concern in the U.S. government, specifically 
the IRS and law enforcement, is the human resources to review and pursue possible 
violators of the BSA. According to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, “the IRS is still not systemically using the CTRs to identify and pursue 
potentially noncompliant individuals.” Even though this statement is directed toward IRS 
management, it does not address the staffing levels and burden placed on the IRS. The 
National Treasury employees Union reported the IRS lost “$715 million in funding and 
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22,000 full-time employees since 2010.”301 If the IRS is unable to comb through CTR 
filing effectively, why is legislation mandating financial institutions file the CTRs at the 
$10,000 monetary threshold? In 2017, financial institutions filed 15.8 million CTRs.302 
The larger financial institutions are spending approximately $1 billion annually in BSA 
compliance.303 These high compliance costs and the lack of U.S. government staffing 
levels to review and investigate CTR filings actively, supports raising the current 
monetary threshold.  
2. Suspicious Activity Reports 
The current monetary thresholds for SARs in the BSA as $1,000, $2,000, and 
$5,000 for specific categories should remain the same. The primary goal of SARs is to 
report suspected or known violators to law enforcement for further investigations. This 
reporting process is instrumental in maintaining the integrity of the financial systems and 
deterring criminals from using the Federal Reserve System to launder funds. With the 
number of financial transactions taking place on a daily bases, bank investigators have no 
intent on conducting surveillance of citizens bank accounts. Investigators search for 
unordinary or questionable activity. In 2017, financial institutions filed 1.5 million SARs; 
these numbers are an extraordinary human resource burden task.304 Daily, FinCEN takes 
the SARs running them through automated and internal business rule sets to identify 
activity requiring additional review for analysis.305 This internal process generates around 
50 matches daily that are distributed to law enforcement around the county to identify 
and disrupt illegal activity.306 Based on this internal process, not only are the financial 
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institutions declaring the activity suspicious but further analysis is needed by FinCEN to 
give law enforcement the ability to review and pursue only suspicious activity.  
3. Beneficial Ownership Provision 
This paper recommends adding the beneficial ownership provision to the BSA. 
For years, the beneficial ownership provision has been highly contentious. Weighting the 
delicate balance between corporate privacy and the ability to pursue criminals hiding 
behind protective lines must be addressed. Concurring with the argument is the recent 
introduction of bill, H.R. 2513, the “Corporate Transparency Act,” on May 11, 2019, by 
Representative Carolyn Maloney.307 The Corporate Transparency Act states:  
To ensure person who form corporations or limited liability companies in 
the United States disclose the beneficial owners of those corporations or 
limited liability companies, in order to prevent wrongdoers from 
exploiting United States corporations and limited liability companies for 
criminal gain, to assist law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and 
punishing terrorism, money laundering, and other misconduct involving 
Untied States corporations and limited liability companies, and for other 
purposes. 
This bill addresses the contentious issue removed from the Counter Terrorism and 
Illicit Finance Act. The finance sub-committee supports the recommendation with a 
bipartisan 43–16 passage, thus moving the bill to the full chamber for further 
consideration.308 The beneficial ownership provision assists law enforcement and the 
U.S. international law enforcement partners to pursue money launders hiding behind 
layers of corporate bureaucracies aggressively. 
4. Machine Learning  
ML technology should not be mandated in the BSA, but encouraged as the 
technology develops. According to the matrix, the complexity of the technology, the 
monetary cost to banking institutions, privacy concerns, and political oppositions are all 
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reasons for not mandating this type of technology in the BSA. Also, this thesis addresses 
numerous concerns regarding this advanced technology. 
The technology should only be encouraged as fintech continues to develop and 
increase. ML removes the human element of surveilling and increases efficiency in 
processing or reviewing enormous amounts of financial data. Larger financial institutions 
should be encouraged to explore ML technology to assist with SAR detection and 
submitting those documents through the BSA E-Filing System.309 However, based on the 
numerous concerns mentioned previously in the paper, ML should only be encouraged 
and not required. 
5. Digital Currency 
The BSA should regulate digital currency. FinCEN has already mandated several 
regulations on digital currency exchangers, but these regulations should be discussed and 
addressed by legislators. The BSA should specifically address advanced privacy digital 
coins like Monera, Zcash, and Dash. These privacy coins are designed for increased 
privacy, yet are untraceable by LE investigators. The BSA should also regulate mixer and 
tumblers, such as Bitmixer or Helix, that are primarily used by criminals to launder illicit 
funds. The mixers and tumblers should be required to keep financial records as a money 
services business.  
6. Know Your Customer 
The BSA should provide banks with a minimum standard for a client to open an 
account. Using fintech, the BSA should consider recommending biometrics as a 
component of KYC requirement. According to the Pew Research Center, over 95% of 
adults from the ages of 18–34 in the United States have a smartphone device.310 A 
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majority of cellphones work with biometrics, whether using fingerprints or facial 
recognition to unlock the device. For those without a smartphone device, they can access 
a bank within their area to provide biometrics information.  
The BSA should also require a risk-based approach regarding KYC, as suggested 
by the Financial Crimes Task Force.311 These recommendations ensure consistency not 
only throughout the United States but also globally. Using a risk-based approach ensures 
additional KYC requirement for high-risk countries enhancing customer identification 
and customer due diligence. 
DLT should not be mandated within the BSA, but should be encouraged as 
technology advances. Like ML, DLT is extremely complex, costly to implement and 
maintain, with privacy concerns and political oppositions. For these reasons, mandating 
this type of technology should only be encouraged. 
7. Peer-to-Peer 
The BSA must hold P2P payment services more accountable by increased 
monitoring, especially through the recording of financial transactions as related to IMEI, 
IMSI, and ICCID. With the development of the fintech, specifically mobile device 
platforms, access to mobile money continues to shape the ability to buy, sell, and transfer 
money at higher speeds with minimal human interaction. As more consumers and 
merchants embrace these solutions, criminals use these same platforms to exploit or 
launder illicit funds.  
The legislators should be cautious in restricting innovation within the United 
States, as fintech encourages financial ingenuity and security to accelerate financial 
services globally. Likewise, the BSA should support fintech throughout the financial 
sector, but only mandating the use of fintech if beneficial. 
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B. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
Implementing these recommendations in the BSA is a challenging obstacle to 
overcome. Before the changes can occur, the Treasury Department, members of the 
House Financial Services Committee, Congressmen, Senators, or even a lobbyist 
involved in the financial services sector must construct a preliminary bill. Designing a 
bill that accounts for these various interest groups is a difficult task. Thus, striking a 
proper balance is instrumental in obtaining bi-partisan support. The recommendations of 
this thesis consider the various interest groups and attempt to find the proper balance 
between privacy advocates, the regulated, law enforcement, and the regulators. Moving 
forward, the Treasury Department should write a bill adding the aforementioned 
recommendations, as well as understanding the objections from the various interest 
groups. Discussions and modifications to the proposed bill occurs once introduced to the 
House Financial Service Committee.  
C. FUTURE AREA OF RESEARCH 
In dealing with regulation to prevent money laundering, continued research can 
pursue various options. One option, should an international body be created to monitor 
and regulate this new form of exchange? A primary issue is the specific regulation of 
digital currency. As mentioned in this paper, digital currency is not backed by any 
government or national body. Another option of continued research, should regulation 
limit the use of privacy coins, like Monaro, that is specifically designed to avoid tracing? 
Alternatively, do the privacy advocates have a valid position that regulation should not 
restrict individual privacy regarding new forms of cryptocurrency? In creating a new 
international body, who should be part of this committee and how much authority? 
Cryptocurrency is unlikely to be an issue for just one nation, but a global concern for 
future generations.  
Narrowing the focus of digital currency as a nation state-sponsored concern leads 
to another area of research. Should the U.S. Federal Reserve or the U.S. Department of 
Treasury create their own digital currency with oversight? What are the advantages, 
limitations, and possible unintended consequences of the U.S. government operating its 
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cryptocurrency? One of the main benefits of digital currency is the fact that it operates as 
a decentralized authority. If the U.S. government owned and operated a form of digital 
currency, is another layer of bureaucracy and regulations added that so many are 
attempting to avoid. 
As mentioned in this thesis, blockchain technology has several benefits in the 
financial services sector. Knowing a majority of financial institutions are exploring this 
new avenue of technology, how can blockchain technology protect anyone’s financial 
privacy? If banking institutions use blockchain technology, how much control do these 
institutions have in the verification and authentication process? 
A final area of research is the use of mobile devices and their impact on the 
financial services sector. With the development of smartphones and increased 
applications, mobile devices will significantly impact the future of U.S. society with 
financial banking, investments, and loans. Should mobile banking be regulated using an 
international working group? As the world becomes more connected through Wi-Fi and 
cellular, mobile banking will continue to grow and impact improvised areas globally.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Supporters and challengers of the BSA all agree on the need to update the 
historical mandates within the act to address emerging threats and technology. The BSA 
needs to address outdated monetary thresholds for CTRs and confront the beneficial 
ownership provision. Likewise, the BSA needs to regulate innovative financial 
technologies like digital currency, KYC, and P2P, to deter the movement of criminal 
funds. With the innovations of financial technology, criminals are finding new ways to 
launder money, while obfuscating detection from law enforcement authorities.  
The BSA should address not only the present but future concerns involving 
technology and potential risks to the financial sector, while maintaining a balance 
between increased regulation to hinder criminal activity without stifling the growth of 
innovation. As criminal organizations continue to move money throughout the U.S. 
financial services sector, legislators should amend the BSA to address these areas of 
concern to ensure financial stability and integrity. 
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